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Abstract
Designing an incentive compatible auction that maximizes expected revenue is an intricate
task. The single-item case was resolved in a seminal piece of work by Myerson in 1981. Even
after 30-40 years of intense research the problem remains unsolved for seemingly simple multi-
bidder, multi-item settings. In this work, we initiate the exploration of the use of tools from deep
learning for the automated design of optimal auctions. We model an auction as a multi-layer
neural network, frame optimal auction design as a constrained learning problem, and show how
it can be solved using standard pipelines. We prove generalization bounds and present extensive
experiments, recovering essentially all known analytical solutions for multi-item settings, and
obtaining novel mechanisms for settings in which the optimal mechanism is unknown.
1 Introduction
Optimal auction design is one of the cornerstones of economic theory. It is of great practical
importance, as auctions are used across industries and by the public sector to organize the sale of
their products and services. Concrete examples are the US FCC Incentive Auction, the sponsored
search auctions conducted by web search engines such as Google, or the auctions run on platforms
such as eBay. In the standard independent private valuations model, each bidder has a valuation
function over subsets of items, drawn independently from not necessarily identical distributions.
It is assumed that the auctioneer knows the distributions and can (and will) use this information
in designing the auction. A major difficulty in designing auctions is that valuations are private
and bidders need to be incentivized to report their valuations truthfully. The goal is to learn an
incentive compatible auction that maximizes revenue.
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Ellison, Sergiu Hart, Ron Lavi, Kevin Leyton-Brown, Shengwu Li, Noam Nisan, Parag Pathak, Alexander Rush, Karl
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of this paper was posted on arXiv on June 12, 2017. The source code for all experiments is available from Github at
https://github.com/saisrivatsan/deep-opt-auctions.
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In a seminal piece of work, Myerson resolved the optimal auction design problem when there is a
single item for sale [Myerson, 1981]. Quite astonishingly, even after 30-40 years of intense research,
the problem is not completely resolved even for a simple setting with two bidders and two items.
While there have been some elegant partial characterization results [Manelli and Vincent, 2006,
Pavlov, 2011, Haghpanah and Hartline, 2015, Giannakopoulos and Koutsoupias, 2015, Daskalakis
et al., 2017, Yao, 2017], and an impressive sequence of recent algorithmic results [Cai et al., 2012b,a,
2013, Chawla et al., 2010, Cai and Huang, 2013, Babaioff et al., 2014, Yao, 2015, Hart and Nisan,
2017, Cai and Zhao, 2017], most of these results apply to the weaker notion of Bayesian incentive
compatibility (BIC) or yield mechanisms that are only approximately optimal. Our focus is on
designing auctions that are optimal, and that satisfy dominant strategy incentive compatibility
(DSIC), the more robust and desirable notion of incentive compatibility.
A recent, concurrent line of work started to bring in tools from machine learning and computa-
tional learning theory to design auctions from samples of bidder valuations. Much of the effort here
has focused on analyzing the sample complexity of designing revenue-maximizing auctions [e.g.,
Cole and Roughgarden, 2014, Mohri and Medina, 2016]. A handful of works has leveraged ma-
chine learning to optimize different aspects of mechanisms [e.g., Lahaie, 2011, Du¨tting et al., 2014,
Narasimhan et al., 2016], but none of these offers the generality and flexibility of our approach.
There have also been computational approaches to auction design, under the agenda of automated
mechanism design [Conitzer and Sandholm, 2002, 2004, Sandholm and Likhodedov, 2015], but
these are limited to specialized classes of auctions known to be incentive compatible.
Our contribution. In this work we provide the first, general purpose, end-to-end approach for
solving the multi-item auction design problem. We use multi-layer neural networks to encode
auction mechanisms, with bidder valuations being the input and allocation and payment decisions
being the output. We then train the networks using samples from the value distributions by
maximizing expected revenue subject to constraints for incentive compatibility.
To be able to tackle this problem using standard pipelines, we restate the incentive compati-
bility constraint as requiring the expected ex post regret for the auction to be zero. We adopt the
augmented Lagrangian method to solve the resulting constrained optimization problem, where in
each iteration we push gradients through the regret term, by solving an inner optimization problem
to find the optimal misreport for each bidder and valuation profile.
We describe network architectures for bidders with additive, unit-demand, and combinatorial
valuations, and present extensive experiments that show that:
(a) Our approach is capable of recovering essentially all analytical solutions for multi-item settings
that have been obtained over the past 30-40 years by finding auctions with almost optimal
revenue and vanishingly small regret that match the allocation and payment rules of the
theoretically optimal auctions to surprising accuracy.
(b) Our approach finds high-revenue auctions with negligibly small regret in settings in which
the optimal auction is unknown, matching or outperforming state-of-the-art computational
results [Sandholm and Likhodedov, 2015].
(c) Whereas the largest setting presently studied in the analytical literature is one with 2 bidders
and 2 items, our approach learns auctions for larger settings, such as a 5 bidder, 10 items
setting, where optimal auctions have been to hard to design, and finds low regret auctions
that yield higher revenue than strong baselines.
We also prove a novel generalization bound, which implies that, with high probability, for our
architectures high revenue and low regret on the training data translates into high revenue and low
regret on freshly sampled valuations.
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In Appendix A and B, we further show that in important special cases it is possible to achieve
exact IC by encoding known characterization results, such as convexity of the induced utilities or
monotonicity of the allocation rule, in the network architecture.
Discussion. By focusing on expected ex post regret we adopt a quantifiable relaxation of dominant-
strategy incentive compatibility, first introduced in [Du¨tting et al., 2014]. Our experiments suggest
that this relaxation is an effective tool for approximating the optimal DSIC auctions.
While not strictly limited to neural networks our approach benefits from the expressive power
of neural networks and the ability to enforce complex constraints in the training problem using the
standard pipeline. A key advantage of our method over state-of-the-art automated mechanism de-
sign approaches (such as [Sandholm and Likhodedov, 2015]) is that we optimize over a broader class
of not necessarily incentive compatible mechanisms, and are only constrained by the expressivity
of the neural network architecture.
While the original work on automated auction design framed the problem as a linear program
(LP) [Conitzer and Sandholm, 2002, 2004], follow-up works have acknowledged that this approach
has severe scalability issues as it requires a number of constraints and variables that is exponential
in the number of agents and items [Guo and Conitzer, 2010]. We find that even for small setting
with 2 bidders and 3 items (and a discretization of the value into 5 bins per item) the LP takes 69
hours to complete since the LP needs to handle ≈ 105 decision variables and ≈ 4× 106 constraints.
For the same setting, our approach found an auction with lower regret in just over 9 hours (see
Table 2).
Further related work. There are sample complexity results in the literature for the design of
optimal single-item auctions [Cole and Roughgarden, 2014, Mohri and Medina, 2016, Huang et al.,
2015], single bidder, multi-item auctions [Dughmi et al., 2014], general single-parameter settings
[Morgenstern and Roughgarden, 2015], combinatorial auctions [Balcan et al., 2016, Morgenstern
and Roughgarden, 2016, Syrgkanis, 2017], and allocation mechanisms (both with and without
money) [Narasimhan and Parkes, 2016].
In addition, several other research groups have recently picked up deep nets and inference tools
and applied them to economic problems, different from the one we consider here. These include the
use of neural networks to predict behavior of human participants in strategic scenarios [Hartford
et al., 2016], an automated equilibrium analysis of mechanisms [Thompson et al., 2017], deep nets
for causal inference [Hartford et al., 2017, Louizos et al., 2017], and deep reinforcement learning for
solving combinatorial games [Raghu et al., 2018].
There has also been follow-up work to the present paper that extends our approach to budget
constrained bidders [Feng et al., 2018] and to the facility location problem [Golowich et al., 2018],
and that develops specialized architectures for single bidder settings that satisfy IC [Shen et al.,
2019].
2 Auction Design as a Learning Problem
Auction design basics. We consider a setting with a set of n bidders N = {1, . . . , n} and m
items M = {1, . . . ,m}. Each bidder i has a valuation function vi : 2M → R≥0, where vi(S) denotes
how much the bidder values the subset of items S ⊆ M . In the simplest case, a bidder may have
additive valuations, where she has a value for individual items in M , and her value for a subset of
items S ⊆ M : vi(S) =
∑
j∈S vi({j}). Bidder i’s valuation function is drawn independently from
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a distribution Fi over possible valuation functions Vi. We write v = (v1, . . . , vn) for a profile of
valuations, and denote V =
∏n
i=1 Vi.
The auctioneer knows the distributions F = (F1, . . . , Fn), but does not know the bidders’
realized valuation v. The bidders report their valuations (perhaps untruthfully), and an auction
decides on an allocation of items to the bidders and charges a payment to them. We denote an
auction (g, p) as a pair of allocation rules gi : V → 2M and payment rules pi : V → R≥0 (these rules
can be randomized). Given bids b = (b1, . . . , bn) ∈ V , the auction computes an allocation g(b) and
payments p(b).
A bidder with valuation vi receives a utility ui(vi, b) = vi(gi(b))− pi(b) for report of bid profile
b. Bidders are strategic and seek to maximize their utility, and may report bids that are different
from their valuations. Let v−i denote the valuation profile v = (v1, . . . , vn) without element vi,
similarly for b−i, and let V−i =
∏
j 6=i Vj denote the possible valuation profiles of bidders other
than bidder i. An auction is dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC), if each bidder’s utility
is maximized by reporting truthfully no matter what the other bidders report. In other words,
ui(vi, (vi, b−i)) ≥ ui(vi, (bi, b−i)) for every bidder i, every valuation vi ∈ Vi, every bid bi ∈ Vi, and
all bids b−i ∈ V−i from others. An auction is (ex post) individually rational (IR) if each bidder
receives a non-zero utility, i.e. ui(vi, (vi, b−i)) ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ N , vi ∈ Vi, and b−i ∈ V−i .
In a DSIC auction, it is in the best interest of each bidder to report truthfully, and so the
revenue on valuation profile v is
∑
i pi(v). Optimal auction design seeks to identify a DSIC auction
that maximizes expected revenue.
Formulation as a learning problem. We pose the problem of optimal auction design as a
learning problem, where in the place of a loss function that measures error against a target label,
we adopt the negated, expected revenue on valuations drawn from F . We are given a parametric
class of auctions, (gw, pw) ∈ M, for parameters w ∈ Rd (some d ∈ N), and a sample of bidder
valuation profiles S = {v(1), . . . , v(L)} drawn i.i.d. from F .1 The goal is to find an auction that
minimizes the negated, expected revenue −∑i∈N pwi (v), among all auctions in M that satisfy
incentive compatibility.
In particular, we introduce constraints in the learning problem to ensure that the chosen auction
satisfies incentive compatibility. For this, we define the ex post regret for each bidder to measure
the extent to which an auction violates incentive compatibility. Fixing the bids of others, the ex
post regret for a bidder is the maximum increase in her utility, considering all possible non-truthful
bids. We will be interested in the expected ex post regret for bidder i:
rgt i(w) = E
[
max
v′i∈Vi
uwi (vi; (v
′
i, v−i))− uwi (vi; (vi, v−i))
]
,
where the expectation is over v ∼ F and uwi (vi, b) = vi(gwi (b))−pwi (b) for given model parameters
w. We assume that F has full support on the space of valuation profiles V , and recognizing that
the regret is non-negative, an auction satisfies DSIC if and only if rgt i(w) = 0,∀i ∈ N .
Given this, we re-formulate the learning problem as minimizing the expected loss, i.e., the
expected negated revenue s.t. the expected ex post regret being 0 for each bidder:
min
w∈Rd
Ev∼F
[
−
∑
i∈N
pwi (v)
]
s.t. rgti(w) = 0, ∀i ∈ N.
1Note that there is no need to compute equilibrium inputs— we sample true profiles, and seek to learn rules that
are IC.
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Given a sample S of L valuation profiles from F , we estimate the empirical ex post regret for bidder
i as:
r̂gt i(w) =
1
L
L∑
`=1
max
v′i∈Vi
uwi
(
v
(`)
i ;
(
v′i, v
(`)
−i
))− uwi (v(`)i ; v(`)), (1)
and seek to minimize the empirical loss subject to the empirical regret being zero for all bidders:
min
w∈Rd
− 1
L
L∑
`=1
n∑
i=1
pwi (v
(`))
s.t. r̂gti(w) = 0, ∀i ∈ N. (2)
Individual rationality. We will additionally require the designed auction to satisfy IR, which can be
ensured by restricting our search space to a class of parametrized auctions (gw, pw) that charge no
bidder more than her expected utility for an allocation. In Section 3, we will model the allocation
and payment rules as neural networks and incorporate the IR requirement in the architecture.
Generalization bound. We provide a generalization bound for the revenue and regret. We
bound the gap between the empirical regret and the expected regret in terms of the sample size,
for any auction chosen from a finite capacity class. We show a similar result for the revenue.
To deal with the non-standard ‘max’ structure in the regret, we measure the capacity of an auc-
tion class using a definition of covering numbers used in the ranking literature [Rudin and Schapire,
2009]. We define the `∞,1 distance between auctions (g, p), (g′, p′) ∈ M as maxv∈V
∑
i,j |gij(v) −
g′ij(v)|+
∑
i |pi(v)− p′i(v)|. For any  > 0, let N∞(M, ) be the minimum number of balls of radius
 required to cover M under the `∞,1 distance.
Theorem 1. For each bidder i, assume w.l.o.g. the valuation function vi(S) ≤ 1, ∀S ⊆ M . Let
M be a class of auctions that satisfy individual rationality. Fix δ ∈ (0, 1). With probability at least
1− δ over draw of sample S of L profiles from F , for any (gw, pw) ∈M,
Ev∼F
[
−
∑
i∈N
pwi (v)
]
≤ − 1
L
L∑
`=1
n∑
i=1
pwi (v
(`)) + 2n∆L + Cn
√
log(1/δ)
L
and, for all i ∈ N ,
1
n
n∑
i=1
rgti(w) ≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
r̂gti(w) + 2∆L + C
′
√
log(1/δ)
L
,
where ∆L = inf>0
{

n + 2
√
2 log(N∞(M, /2))
L
}
and C,C ′ are distribution-independent constants.
See Appendix F for the proof. If the term ∆L in the above bound goes down to 0 as the sample size
L increases, then the difference between the expected and empirical regret is upper bounded by a
term that goes to 0 as L → ∞. In Theorem 2 in Section 3, we bound ∆L for the neural network
architectures we present in this paper.
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Figure 1: The allocation and payment networks for a setting with n additive bidders and m items. The
inputs are bids from bidders for each item. The rev and each rgti are defined as a function of the parameters
of the allocation and payment networks w = (wg, wp).
3 Neural Network Architecture
We describe neural network architectures, which we refer to as RegretNet, for modeling multi-item
auctions. We consider bidders with additive, unit-demand, and general combinatorial valuations.
The architectures contain two logically distinct components: the allocation and payment networks.
The outputs of these networks are used to compute the regret and revenue of the auction.
Additive valuations. A bidder has additive valuations if the bidder’s value for a bundle of items
S ⊆M is the sum of her value for the individual items in S, i.e. vi(S) =
∑
j∈S vi(j). In this case, the
bidders report only their valuations for individual items. The architecture for this setting models
a randomized allocation network gw : Rnm → [0, 1]nm and a payment network pw : Rnm → Rn≥0,
both of which are modeled as feed-forward, fully-connected networks with tanh activations. The
input layer of the networks consists of bids bij representing the valuation of bidder i for item j.
The allocation network outputs a vector of allocation probabilities z1j = g1j(b), . . . , znj = gnj(b),
for each item j ∈ [m]. To ensure feasibility, i.e. that the probability of an item being allocated is
at most 1, the allocations are computed using a softmax activation function, so that for all items
j,
∑n
i=1 zij ≤ 1 To accommodate the possibility of an item not being assigned to any bidder, we
include a dummy node in the softmax computation which holds the residual allocation probabilities.
Bundling of items is possible because the output units allocating items to the same bidder can be
correlated. The payment network outputs a payment for each bidder that denotes the amount the
bidder should pay in expectation, for this particular bid profile.
To ensure that the auction satisfies individual rationality, i.e. does not charge a bidder more than
her expected value for the allocation, the network first computes a fractional payment p˜i ∈ [0, 1]
for each bidder i using a sigmoid unit, and outputs a payment pi = p˜i
∑m
j=1 zij bij , where zij ’s are
outputs from the allocation network. An overview of the architecture is shown in Figure 1, where
the revenue and regret are computed as functions of the parameters of the allocation and payment
networks.
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Figure 2: The allocation network for settings with n unit-demand bidders and m items, where s¯ij =
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skj . The payment networks for this setting is the same as in Figure 1.
Unit-demand valuations. A bidder has unit-demand valuations when the bidder’s value for
a bundle of items S ⊆ M is the maximum value she assigns to any one item in the bundle,
i.e. vi(S) = maxj∈S vi(j). The allocation network for unit-demand bidders is the feed-forward
network shown in Figure 2(a). For revenue maximization in this setting, it can be shown that
it is sufficient to consider allocation rules that assign at most one item to each bidder.2 In the
case of randomized allocation rules, this would require that the total allocation for each bidder
is at most 1, i.e.
∑
j zij ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ [n]. We would also require that no item is over-allocated,
i.e.
∑
i zij ≤ 1, ∀j ∈ [m]. Hence, we design allocation networks for which the matrix of output
probabilities [zij ]
n
i,j=1 is doubly stochastic.
3
In particular, we have the allocation network compute two sets of scores sij ’s and s
′
ij ’s, with
the first set of scores normalized along the rows, and the second set of scores normalized along the
columns. Both normalizations can be performed by passing these scores through softmax functions.
The allocation for bidder i and item j is then computed as the minimum of the corresponding
normalized scores:
zij = ϕ
DS
ij (s, s
′) = min
{
esij∑n+1
k=1 e
skj
,
es
′
ij∑m+1
k=1 e
s′jk
}
,
where indices n+1 and m+1 denote dummy inputs that correspond to an item not being allocated
to any bidder, and a bidder not being allocated any item respectively.
Lemma 1. The allocation ϕDS(s, s′) is doubly stochastic ∀ s, s′ ∈ Rnm. Furthermore, for any
doubly stochastic allocation z ∈ [0, 1]nm, ∃ s, s′ ∈ Rnm, for which z = ϕDS(s, s′).
The payment network is the same as in Figure 1.
Combinatorial valuations. We also consider bidders with general, combinatorial valuations. In
the present work, we develop this architecture only for small number of items. In this case, each
bidder i reports a bid bi,S for every bundle of items S ⊆ M (except the empty bundle, for which
2 This holds by a simple reduction argument: for any IC auction that allocates multiple items, one can construct
an IC auction with the same revenue by retaining only the most-preferred item among those allocated to the bidder.
3 A randomized allocation represented by a doubly-stochastic matrix can be decomposed into a lottery over
deterministic one-to-one assignments [Birkhoff, 1946, von Neumann, 1953].
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her valuation is taken as zero). The allocation network has an output zi,S ∈ [0, 1] for each bidder
i and bundle S, denoting the probability that the bidder is allocated the bundle. To prevent the
items from being over-allocated, we require that the probability that an item appears in a bundle
allocated to some bidder is at most 1. We also require that the total allocation to a bidder is at
most 1: ∑
i∈N
∑
S⊆M :j∈S
zi,S ≤ 1, ∀j ∈M ; (3)∑
S⊆M
zi,S ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ N. (4)
We refer to an allocation that satisfies constraints (3)–(4) as being combinatorial feasible. To
enforce these constraints, we will have the allocation network compute a set of scores for each item
and a set of scores for each agent. Specifically, there is a group of bidder-wise scores si,S ,∀S ⊆M
for each bidder i ∈ N , and a group of item-wise scores s(j)i,S , ∀i ∈ N, S ⊆M for each item j ∈ M .
Each group of scores is normalized using a softmax function: s¯i,S = exp(si,S)/
∑
S′ exp(si,S′) and
s¯
(j)
i,S = exp(s
(j)
i,S)/
∑
i′,S′ exp(s
(j)
i′,S′). The allocation for bidder i and bundle S ⊆ M is defined as the
minimum of the normalized bidder-wise score s¯i,S for i and the normalized item-wise scores s¯
(j)
i,S for
each j ∈ S:
zi,S = ϕ
CF
i,S (s, s
(1), . . . , s(m)) = min
{
s¯i,S , s¯
(j)
i,S : j ∈ S
}
.
Lemma 2. The allocation ϕCF (s, s(1), . . . , s(m)) is combinatorial feasible ∀ s, s(1), . . . , s(m) ∈ Rn2m.
Furthermore, for any combinatorial feasible allocation z ∈ [0, 1]n2m, ∃ s, s(1), . . . , s(m) ∈ Rn2m, for
which z = ϕCF (s, s(1), . . . , s(m)).
Figure 2(b) shows the network architecture for a setting with 2 bidders and 2 items. For ease of
exposition, we ignore the empty bundle in our discussion. For each bidder i ∈ {1, 2}, the network
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computes three scores si,{1}, si,{2}, and si,{1,2}, one for each bundle that she can be assigned, and
normalizes them using a softmax function. The network also computes four scores for item 1:
s11,{1}, s
1
2,{1}, s
1
1,{1,2}, and s
1
2,{1,2}, one for each assignment where item 1 is present, and similarly,
four scores for item 2: s21,{2}, s
2
2,{2}, s
2
1,{1,2}, and s
2
2,{1,2}. Each set of scores is then normalized by
separate softmax functions. The final allocation for each bidder i is: zi,{1} = min{s¯i,{1}, s¯1i,{1}},
zi,{2} = min{s¯i,{2}, s¯2i,{2}}, and zi,{1,2} = min{s¯i,{1,2}, s¯1i,{1,2}, s¯2i,{1,2}}.
The payment network for combinatorial bidders has the same structure as the one in Figure 1,
computing a fractional payment p˜i ∈ [0, 1] for each bidder i using a sigmoidal unit, and outputting
a payment pi = p˜i
∑
S⊆M zi,S bij , where zi,S ’s are the outputs from the allocation network.
Covering number bounds. We now bound the term ∆L in the generalization bound in Theorem
1 for the the neural networks presented above.
Theorem 2. For RegretNet with R hidden layers, K nodes per hidden layer, da parameters in the
allocation network, dp parameters in the payment network, and the vector of all model parameters
‖w‖1 ≤W , the following are the bounds on the term ∆L for different bidder valuation types:
(a) additive valuations:
∆L ≤ O
(√
R(da + dp) log(LW max{K,mn})/L
)
,
(b) unit-demand valuations:
∆L ≤ O
(√
R(da + dp) log(LW max{K,mn})/L
)
,
(c) combinatorial valuations:
∆L ≤ O
(√
R(da + dp) log(LW max{K,n 2m})/L
)
.
See Appendix F for the proof. As the sample size L→∞, the term ∆L → 0. The dependence
of the above result on the number of layers, nodes and parameters in the network is similar to
standard covering number bounds for neural networks [Anthony and Bartlett, 2009]. Note that
the logarithm in the bound for combinatorial valuations cancels the exponential dependence on the
number of items m.
4 Optimization and Training
We use the augmented Lagrangian method to solve the constrained training problem in (2) over the
space of neural network parameters w. We first define the Lagrangian function for the optimization
problem, augmented with a quadratic penalty term for violating the constraints:
Cρ(w;λ) = − 1
L
L∑
`=1
∑
i∈N
pwi (v
(`)) +
∑
i∈N
λi r̂gt i(w) +
ρ
2
(∑
i∈N
r̂gt i(w)
)2
where λ ∈ Rn is a vector of Lagrange multipliers, and ρ > 0 is a fixed parameter that controls
the weight on the quadratic penalty. The solver alternates between the following updates in each
iteration on the model parameters and the Lagrange multipliers: (a) wnew ∈ argminw Cρ(wold; λold)
and (b) λnewi = λ
old
i + ρ r̂gt i(w
new), ∀i ∈ N.
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Algorithm 1 RegretNet Training
Input: Minibatches S1, . . . ,ST of size B
Parameters: ∀t, ρt > 0, γ > 0, η > 0, R ∈ N, Z ∈ N
Initialize: w0 ∈ Rd, λ0 ∈ Rn
for t = 0 to T do
Receive minibatch St = {u(1), . . . , u(B)}
Initialize misreports v′(`)i ∈ Vi, ∀` ∈ [B], i ∈ N
for r = 0 to R do
∀` ∈ [B], i ∈ N : v′(`)i ← v′(`)i + γ∇v′i uwi
(
v
(`)
i ;
(
v′(`)i , v
(`)
−i
))
end for
Compute regret gradient: ∀` ∈ [B], i ∈ N :
gt`,i = ∇w
[
uwi
(
v
(`)
i ;
(
v′(`)i , v
(`)
−i
))− uwi (v(`)i ; v(`))] ∣∣∣
w=wt
Compute Lagrangian gradient using (5) and update wt:
wt+1 ← wt − η∇w Cρt(wt, λt)
Update Lagrange multipliers once in Z iterations:
if t is a multiple of Z
λt+1i ← λti + ρt r˜gt i(wt+1), ∀i ∈ N
else
λt+1 ← λt
end for
We divide the training sample S into mini-batches of size B, and perform several passes over
the training samples (with random shuffling of the data after each pass). We denote the minibatch
received at iteration t by St = {u(1), . . . , u(B)}. The update (a) on model parameters involves an
unconstrained optimization of Cρ over w and is performed using a gradient-based optimizer. Let
r̂gt i(St;w) denote the empirical regret r̂gt i(w) in (1) computed on mini-batch St. The gradient of
Cρ w.r.t. w for fixed λt is given by:
∇w Cρ(w; λt) = − 1
B
B∑
`=1
∑
i∈N
∇w pwi (v(`)) +
∑
i∈N
B∑
`=1
λti g`,i + ρ
∑
i∈N
B∑
`=1
r̂gt i(St;w) g`,i (5)
where
g`,i = ∇w
[
max
v′i∈Vi
uwi
(
v
(`)
i ;
(
v′i, v
(`)
−i
))− uwi (v(`)i ; v(`))].
Note that the terms r˜gti and g`,i in turn involve a “max” over misreports for each bidder i
and valuation profile `. We solve the inner maximization over misreports using another gradient
based optimizer, and push the gradient through the utility differences at the optimal misreports.
In particular, we maintain misreports v′(`)i for each i and valuation profile `. For every update
on the model parameters wt, we perform Q gradient updates to compute the optimal misreports:
v′(`)i = v
′(`)
i + γ∇v′iuwi
(
v
(`)
i ;
(
v′(`)i , v
(`)
−i
))
, for some γ > 0.4
In our experiments, we use the Adam optimizer [Kingma and Ba, 2014] for updates on model
parameters w and v′(`)i .
Since the optimization problem we seek to solve is non-convex, the solver is not guaranteed to
reach a globally optimal solution. However, our method proves very effective in our experiments.
4This use of additional gradient updates to find useful misreports has a flavor of adversarial learning.
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Distribution
Opt RegretNet
rev rev rgt
Setting (I) 0.550 0.554 < 0.001
Setting (II) 9.781 9.734 < 0.001
Setting (III) 0.388 0.392 < 0.001
Setting (IV) 0.384 0.384 < 0.001
Setting (V) 2.137 2.137 < 0.001
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Figure 4: (a): Test revenue and regret for Settings (I)-(V). (b): Plot of test revenue and regret as a function
of training epochs for Setting (I).
The learned auctions incur very low regret and closely match the structure of the optimal auctions
in settings where this is known. For more details about the augmented Lagrangian method see
Appendix E.
5 Experimental Results
We demonstrate that our approach can recover near-optimal auctions for essentially all settings for
which the optimal solution is known and that it can find new auctions for settings where there is
no known analytical solution.
Setup. We use the TensorFlow deep learning library to implement our learning algorithms. We
used the Glorot uniform initialization [Glorot and Bengio, 2010] for all networks and the tanh acti-
vation function at the hidden nodes. 5 For all the experiments, we use a sample of 640,000 valuation
profiles for training 6 and a sample of 10,000 profiles for testing. The augmented Lagrangian solver
was run for a maximum of 80 epochs with a minibatch size of 128. The value of ρ in augmented
Lagrangian was set to 1.0 and incremented every 2 epochs. An update on wt was performed for
every minibatch using the Adam optimizer with learning rate 0.001. For each update on wt, we ran
R = 25 misreport updates steps with learning rate 0.1. At the end of 25 updates, the optimized
misreports for the current minibatch were cached and used to initialize the misreports for the same
minibatch in the next epoch. An update on λt was performed once in every 100 minibatches (i.e.
Z = 100). Our experiments were run on a compute cluster with NVDIA GPU cores.7
Evaluation. In addition to the revenue of the learned auction on a test set, we also evaluate the
regret, averaged across all bidders and test valuation profiles, rgt = 1n
∑n
i=1 r̂gt i(f, p). Each r̂gt i
has a‘max’ of the utility function over bidder valuations v′i ∈ Vi (see (1)). We evaluate these terms
by running gradient ascent on v′i with a step-size of 0.1 for 2000 iterations (we test 1000 different
random initial v′i and report the one achieves the largest regret).
Single bidder, multiple items. Even in the simple setting of single bidder auctions, there
are analytical solutions only for special cases. We give the first computational approach that can
handle the general design problem, and compare to the available analytical results. We show that
5ReLU activations yield comparable results for smaller settings, but tanh works better for larger settings.
6For the smaller settings that we experimented with, the performance of RegretNet with smaller training samples
(around 5000) is also well-behaved.
7A single iteration of the augmented Lagrangian took on average 1–17 seconds across experiments.
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Figure 5: Allocation rules learned by RegretNet for single-bidder, two items settings: (a) Setting (I), (b)
Setting (II), (c) Setting (III), (d) Setting (IV), and (e) Setting (V). The solid regions describe the probability
that the bidder is allocated item 1 (left) and item 2 (right) for different valuation inputs. The optimal auctions
are described by the regions separated by the dashed black lines, with the numbers in black the optimal
probability of allocation in the region.
not only are we able to learn auctions with near-optimal revenue, but we are also able to learn
allocation rules that resemble the theoretically optimal rule with surprising accuracy. We consider
the following settings:
(I) Single bidder with additive valuations over 2 items, where the item values are drawn from
U [0, 1]. The optimal auction is given by Manelli and Vincent [2006].
(II) Single additive bidder with preferences over two non-identically distributed items, where
v1 ∼ U [4, 16] and v2 ∼ U [4, 7]. The optimal mechanism is given by Daskalakis et al. [2017].
(III) Single additive bidder with preferences over two items, where (v1, v2) are drawn jointly and
uniformly from a unit triangle with vertices (0, 0), (0, 1) and (1, 0). The optimal mechanism
is due to Haghpanah and Hartline [2015].
(IV) Single unit-demand bidder with preferences over two items, where the item values v1, v2 ∼
U [0, 1]. See [Pavlov, 2011] for the optimal mechanism.
(V) Single bidder with unit-demand valuations over 2 items, where the item values are drawn
from U [2, 3]. The optimal mechanism is again due to Pavlov [2011].
Figure 4 (a) presents the revenue and regret of the final auctions learned for Settings (I) - (V)
on the test set with an architecture with two hidden nodes and 100 nodes per layer.8 The revenue
8Based on evaluations on a held-out set, we found the gains to be negligible when we used more number of layers
or nodes.
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Distribution
RegretNet VVCA AMAbsym
rev rgt rev rev
Setting (VI) 0.878 < 0.001 0.860 0.862
Setting (VII) 2.871 < 0.001 2.741 2.765
Setting (VIII) 4.270 < 0.001 4.209 3.748
Table 1: Performance of RegretNet and the optimal auctions from the VVCA and AMAbsym families of
incentive compatible auctions for Settings (VI)-(VIII).
of the learned auctions is very close to the optimal revenue, with negligibly small regret. In some
cases the learned auctions achieve revenue slightly above that of the optimal incentive compatible
auction. This is possible because of the small, non-zero regret that they incur. The visualizations
of the learned allocation rules in Figure 5 (a)-(e) show that our approach also closely recovers the
structure of the optimal auctions.
Figure 4 (b) presents a plot of revenue and regret as a function of the training epochs (number
of passes through the whole training data). The solver adaptively tunes the Lagrange multiplier
on the regret, focusing on the revenue in the initial iterations and on regret in later iterations.
Multiple bidders, multiple items. We next compare to the state-of-the-art computational
results of Sandholm and Likhodedov [Sandholm and Likhodedov, 2015] for settings for which the
optimal auction is not known. These auctions are obtained by searching over a parameterized class
of incentive compatible auctions. Unlike these prior methods, we do not need to search over a
specific class of incentive compatible auction, and are limited only by the expressive power of the
networks used. We show that this leads to novel auction designs that match or outperform the
state-of-the-art mechanisms.
(VI) 2 additive bidders and 2 items, where bidders draw their value for each item from U [0, 1].
(VII) 2 bidders and 2 items, with v1,1, v1,2, v2,1, v2,2 ∼ U [1, 2], v1,{1,2} = v1,1 + v1,2 + C1 and
v2,{1,2} = v2,1 + v2,2 + C2, where C1, C2 ∼ U [−1, 1].
(VIII) 2 bidders and 2 items, with v1,1, v1,2 ∼ U [1, 2], v2,1, v2,2 ∼ U [1, 5], v1,{1,2} = v1,1 + v1,2 +C1
and v2,{1,2} = v2,1 + v2,2 + C2, where C1, C2 ∼ U [−1, 1].
We adopt the same experimental setup as in settings (I)-(V). We compare the trained mechanism
with the optimal auctions from the VVCA and AMAbsym families of incentive compatible auctions
from [Sandholm and Likhodedov, 2015]. Table 1 summarizes our results. Our approach leads to
significant revenue improvements and tiny regret. Comparing with Figure 4(a), where the regret
of (I) afforded a revenue advantage over OPT of around 0.004 or 0.72%, it seems highly unlikely
that the tiny non-zero regret explains the revenue advantages over these prior results.
Scaling up. We also consider settings with up to 5 bidders and 10 items. Due the exponential
nature of the problem this is several orders of magnitude more complex than what the existing
analytical literature can handle. For the settings that we study running a separate Myerson auction
for each item (Item-wise Myerson) is optimal in the limit of number of bidders [Palfrey, 1983]. We
also compare to a Myerson auction (Bundled Myerson) to sell the entire bundle of items as one
unit. This yields a very strong but still improvable benchmark.
(IX) Single additive bidder with preferences over ten items, where each vi ∼ U [0, 1].
(X) 3 additive bidders and 10 items, where bidders draw their value for each item from U [0, 1].
(XI) 5 additive bidders and 10 items, where bidders draw their value for each item from U [0, 1].
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Setting (IX) 3.461 < 0.003 2.495 3.457
Setting (X) 5.541 < 0.002 5.310 5.009
Setting (XI) 6.778 < 0.005 6.716 5.453
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Figure 6: (a) Revenue and regret on validation set for auctions learned for setting (X) using different
architectures. (b) Test revenue and regret for Settings (IX)-(XI).
Distribution Method rev rgt IR viol. Run-time
2 additive bidders, 3 items with vij ∼ U [0, 1] RegretNet 1.291 < 0.001 0 ∼9 hrsLP (D: 5 bins/value) 1.53 0.019 0.027 69 hrs
Table 2: Test revenue, regret, IR violation, and run-time for RegretNet and LP for a 2 bidder, 3 items
setting with uniform valuations.
For setting (X), we show in Figure 6(a) the revenue and regret of the learned auction on a
validation sample of 10000 profiles, obtained with different architectures. Here (R,K) denotes
an architecture with R hidden layers and K nodes per layer. The (5, 100) architecture has the
lowest regret among all the 100-node networks for both settings above. Figure 6(b) shows that the
final learned auctions of Settings (IX)-(XI) yield higher revenue (with tiny regret) compared to the
baselines.
Comparison to LP. We also compare the running time of our algorithm with the LP approach
proposed by Conitzer and Sandholm [2002, 2004]. To be able to run the LP to completion, we
consider a smaller setting with 2 additive bidders and 3 items, with item values drawn from from
U [0, 1]. The LP is solved with the commercial solver Gurobi . We handle continuous valuations
by discretizing the value into 5 bins per item (resulting in ≈ 105 decision variables and ≈ 4× 106
constraints) and then rounding a continuous input valuation profile to the nearest discrete profile
(for evaluation). See Appendix G for additional details.
The results are shown in Table 2. We also report the violations in IR constraints incurred by
the LP on the test set; for L valuation profiles, this is measured by 1Ln
∑L
`=1
∑
i∈N max{ui(v(`)), 0}.
Due to the coarse discretization, the LP approach suffers significant IR violations (and as a result
yields higher revenue). We are not able to run a LP for this setting in more than 1 week of
compute time for finer discretizations. In contrast, our approach yields much lower regret and no
IR violations (as the neural networks satisfy IR by design), in just around 9 hours. In fact, even
for the larger settings (X) - (XI), the running time of our algorithm was less than 13 hours.
6 Conclusion
Neural networks have been successfully used for data-driven discovery in other contexts, e.g., for
the discovery of new drugs [Gomez-Bombarelli et al., 2018]. We believe that there is also a good
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opportunity to apply deep learning in the context of economic design. In this paper, we have
demonstrated how standard pipelines can re-discover and surpass the analytical and computational
progress in optimal auction design that has been made over the past 30-40 years. While our ap-
proach can easily solve problems that are orders of magnitude more complex than what could
previously be solved with the standard LP-based approach, a natural next step would be to scale
up this approach further to industry scale. We envision progress at scale will come through ad-
dressing the benchmarking question (e.g., through standardized benchmarking suites), and through
additional innovations in network architecture and in regard to methods to minimize ex post regret
during training.
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Appendix
A The RochetNet Framework
In this appendix, we show how to adjust our general approach for the special case of a single bidder
and multiple items with additive or unit-demand preferences, so that it yields essentially optimal
and exactly DSIC auctions.
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Figure 7: RochetNet: (a) Neural network representation of a non-negative, monotone, convex induced
utility function; here hj(b) = wj · b + βj . (b) An example of a utility function represented by RochetNet
for m = 1.
A.1 The Network Architecture
We start with the case where the bidder’s preferences are additive. We make use of the character-
ization for Rochet [1987] for a single bidder problem in terms of the bidder’s induced utility and
its gradient.9 The utility function u : Rm≥0 → R induced by a mechanism (g, p) for a single bidder
is:
u(v) =
m∑
j=1
gj(v) vj − p(v). (6)
This is the bidder’s utility for bidding truthfully when her valuation is v. We say that the utility
function is monotonically non-decreasing if u(v) ≤ u(v′) whenever vj ≤ v′j , ∀j ∈ M . The following
theorem explains the connection between a DSIC mechanism and its induced utility function:
Theorem 3 (Rochet [1987]). A utility function u : Rm≥0 → R is induced by a DSIC mechanism iff
u is 1-Lipschitz w.r.t. the `1-norm, non-decreasing, and convex. Moreover, for such a utility func-
tion u, ∇u(v) exists almost everywhere in Rm≥0, and wherever it exists, ∇u(v) gives the allocation
probabilities for valuation v, and ∇u(v) · v − u(v) is the corresponding payment.
Further, for a mechanism to be IR, its induced utility function must be non-negative, i.e.
u(v) ≥ 0,∀v ∈ Rm≥0. To find the optimal mechanism, we need to search over all non-negative utility
functions that satisfy the conditions in Theorem 4, and pick the one that maximizes expected
revenue. This can be done by modeling the utility function as a neural network, and formulating
the above optimization as a neural network learning problem. The associated mechanism can then
be recovered from the gradient of the learned neural network.
To model a non-negative, monotone, convex, Lipschitz utility function, we use a max of J linear
functions with non-negative coefficients, and 0:
uα,β(v) = max
{
max
j∈[J ]
{wj · v + βj}, 0
}
, (7)
where each wjk = 1/(1 + e
−αjk), for αjk ∈ R, j ∈ [J ], k ∈ M , and βj ∈ R. By bounding the
hyperplane coefficients to [0, 1], we guarantee that the function is 1-Lipschitz.
Theorem 4. For any α ∈ RmJ and β ∈ RJ , the function uα,β is non-negative, monotonically
non-decreasing, convex and 1-Lipschitz w.r.t. the `1-norm.
9Daskalakis et al. [2013] and Daskalakis et al. [2017] also make use of Rochet’s characterization in their duality-
based characterizations for the single-bidder multi-item problem.
19
Proof. The convexity of uα,β follows from the fact it is a “max” of linear functions. We now show
that uα,β is monotonically non-decreasing. Let hj(v) = wj · v + βj . Since wj is non-negative in all
entries, for any vi ≤ v′i, ∀i ∈M , we have hj(v) ≤ hj(v′). Then
uα,β(v) = max
j∈[J ]
hj(v) = hj∗(v) ≤ hj∗(v′) ≤ max
j∈[J ]
hj(v
′) = uα,β(v′),
where j∗ ∈ argminj∈[J ] hj(v). It remains to be shown that uα,β is 1-Lipschitz. For any v, v′ ∈ Rm≥0,
|uα,β(v)− uα,β(v′)| = |max
j∈[J ]
hj(v) − max
j∈[J ]
hj(v
′)| ≤ max
j∈[J ]
|hj(v′) − hj(v)|
= max
j∈[J ]
|wj · (v′ − v)| ≤ max
j∈[J ]
‖wj‖∞ |v′ − v|1 ≤ |v′k − vk|1
where the last inequality holds because each component wjk = σ(αjk) ≤ 1.
The utility function, represented as a single layer neural network, is illustrated in Figure 7(a),
where each hj(b) = wj · b + βj . Figure 7(b) shows an example of a utility function represented by
RochetNet for m = 1. By using a large number of hyperplanes, one can use this neural network
architecture to search over a sufficiently rich class of monotone, convex 1-Lipschitz utility functions.
Once trained, the mechanism (g, p) can be derived from the gradient of the utility function, with
the allocation rule given by:
g(b) = ∇uα,β(b), (8)
and the payment rule is given by the difference between the expected value to the bidder from the
allocation and the bidder’s utility:
p(b) = ∇uα,β(b) · b − uα,β(b). (9)
Here the utility gradient can be computed as: ∇juα,β(b) = wj∗ , for j∗ ∈ argmaxj∈[J ]{wj ·b+βj}.
We seek to minimize the negated, expected revenue:
−Ev∼F
[∇uα,β(v) · v − uα,β(v)]. (10)
To ensure that the objective is a continuous function of the parameters α and β (so that the
parameters can be optimized efficiently), the gradient term is computed approximately by using a
softmax operation in place of the argmax. The loss function that we use is given by the negated
revenue with approximate gradients:
L(α, β) = −Ev∼F
[∇˜uα,β(v) · v − uα,β(v)], (11)
where
∇˜kuα,β(v) =
∑
j∈[J ]
wjk · softmaxj
(
κ · (w1 · v + β1), . . . , κ · (wJ · v + βJ)
)
(12)
and κ > 0 is a constant that controls the quality of the approximation. We seek to optimize
the parameters of the neural network α ∈ RmJ , β ∈ RJ to minimize loss L Given a sample S =
{v(1), . . . , v(L)} drawn from F , we optimize an empirical version of the loss.
Our approach easily extends to a bidder with unit-demand valuations. In this case, the sum
of the allocation probabilities cannot exceed 1. This is enforced by restricting the coefficients for
each hyperplane to sum up to at most 1, i.e.
∑m
k=1wjk ≤ 1, ∀j ∈ [J ]. It can be verified that even
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Distribution
Opt RegretNet RochetNet
rev rev rgt rev
Setting (I) 0.550 0.554 < 0.001 0.550
Setting (II) 9.781 9.734 < 0.001 9.779
Setting (III) 0.388 0.392 < 0.001 0.388
Setting (IV) 0.384 0.384 < 0.001 0.384
Setting (V) 2.137 2.137 < 0.001 2.136
Table 3: Performance of RegretNet and RochetNet for the Settings (I)-(V).
Distribution
RegretNet Item-wise Bundled RochetNet
Myerson Myerson
rev rgt rev rev rev
Setting (IX) 3.461 < 0.003 2.495 3.457 3.459
Table 4: Performance of RegretNet and RochetNet for Setting (IX).
with this restriction, the induced utility function continuous to be monotone, convex and Lipschitz,
ensuring that the resulting mechanism is DSIC.10
A possible interpretation of the RochetNet architecture is that the network maintains a menu
of (randomized) allocations and prices, and chooses the option from the menu that maximizes the
bidder’s utility based on the bidder’s bid. Each linear function hj(b) = wj · b + βj in RochetNet
corresponds to an option on the menu, with the allocation probabilities and payments encoded
through the parameters wj and βj respectively. Recently, Shen et al. [2019] extends our RochetNet
to more general settings, including non-linear utility function setting.
A.2 Experimental Results for RochetNet
Setup. For all the experiments that we report in this section, we use a sample of 640,000 valuation
profiles for training and a sample of 10,000 profiles for testing. We use Adam solver for training, with
learning rate 0.001 and mini-batch size 128. During the training, we set κ = 1000 to approximate
argmax by softmax in Equation (12). We model the induced utility function as a max network over
1000 linear functions.
Benchmark distributions. We first consider the same distributions used to evaluate the Re-
gretNet architecture in Section 5. Table 3 shows the results for Settings (I)-(V). Figure 8 provides
visualizations of the learned allocation rules for these settings. Table 4 shows the results for setting
(IX).
Additional experiments. Finally, we use RochetNet to test a conjecture of Daskalakis et al.
[2013] for a single additive bidder, two item settings where the item valuations are drawn indepen-
dently from uniform distributions. Daskalakis et al. [2013] conjecture that the optimal mechanism
for these settings will assign zero utility to a subset of valuations that have a pentagonal shape.
We applied RochetNet to various valuation distributions of the above form (including settings (I),
(II) and (III)), and find that the learned mechanisms have allocation plots where the zero utility
regions do indeed have a (full or degenerate) pentagonal shape.
10The original characterization of Rochet [1987] applies to general, convex outcome spaces (which—as one can
verify—is indeed the case here).
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Figure 8: Allocation rules learned by RochetNet for single bidder, two items settings. (a) Setting (I) (b)
Setting (II) (c) Setting (III) (d) Setting (IV) (e) Setting (V). The solid regions describe the probability that
the bidder is allocated item 1 (left) and item 2 (right) for different valuation inputs. The optimal auctions
are described by the regions separated by the dashed black lines, with the numbers in black the optimal
probability of allocation in the region.
Discussion. Generally, RochetNet is able to yield sharper decision boundaries than RegretNet,
and match the optimal mechanism more closely. This is because for the valuation distributions
considered, the optimal mechanism can be described by a finite menu of allocations and payments,
and RochetNet effectively recovers the optimal menu of options for these distributions. With this
carefully designed structure, the running time of RochetNet for each of the above experiments is
less than 10 minutes, and much faster than RegretNet.
B The MyersonNet Approach
We next present specialized architectures for the special case of selling a single item to muliple
buyers that yield exactly DSIC auctions.
In the single-item setting, each bidder holds a private value vi ∈ R≥0 for the item. We consider
a randomized mechanism (g, p) that maps a reported bid profile b ∈ Rn≥0 to a vector of allocation
probabilities g(b) ∈ Rn≥0, where gi(b) ∈ R≥0 denotes the probability that bidder i is allocated the
item and
∑n
i=1 gi(b) ≤ 1. We shall represent the payment rule pi via a price conditioned on the
item being allocated to bidder i, i.e. pi(b) = gi(b) ti(b) for some conditional payment function
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ti : Rn≥0 → R≥0. The expected revenue of the mechanism, when bidders are truthful, is given by:
rev(g, p) = Ev∼F
[ n∑
i=1
gi(v) ti(v)
]
. (13)
The structure of the revenue-optimal auction is well understood for this setting.
Theorem 5 (Myerson [1981]). There exist a collection of monotonically increasing functions φ¯i :
Vi → R called the ironed virtual valuation functions such that the optimal BIC mechanism for
selling a single item is the DSIC mechanism that assigns the item to the buyer i with the highest
ironed virtual value φ¯i(vi) assuming this quantity is positive and charges the winning bidder the
smallest bid that ensures that the bidder is winning.
From Myerson’s characterization, the optimal auction for regular distributions is deterministic
and can be described by a set of strictly monotone virtual value transformations φ¯1, . . . , φ¯n :
R≥0 → R≥0. The auction can be viewed as applying the monotone transformations to the input
bids b¯i = φ¯i(bi), feeding the computed virtual values to a second price auction (SPA) with zero
reserve price (g0, p0), making an allocation according to g0(b¯), and charging a payment φ¯−1i (p
0
i (b¯))
for agent i. In fact, this auction is DSIC for any choice of the strictly monotone virtual value
functions:
Theorem 6. For any set of strictly monotonically increasing functions φ¯1, . . . , φ¯n : R≥0 → R≥0,
an auction defined by outcome rule gi = g
0
i ◦ φ¯ and payment rule pi = φ¯−1i ◦ p0i ◦ φ¯ is DSIC and
IR.
Thus designing the optimal DSIC auction for a regular distribution reduces to finding a set of
strictly monotone virtual value functions that, when composed with the second price auction with
zero reserve, yields maximum expected revenue. In the case of irregular distributions, the optimal
mechanism is characterized by ironed virtual value transformations, which need not be strictly
monotone or invertible. Hence the prescribed template of using strictly monotone transforms in
conjunction with a SPA with zero reserve may not exactly recover the optimal mechanism. We
shall see that the proposed approach can still be used to design mechanisms that yield revenue
very close to the optimal revenue in the irregular case. See Figure 9(a) for the overall design of the
neural network in this setting.
Modeling monotone transforms. We model each virtual value function φ¯i as a two-layer feed-
forward network with min and max operations over linear functions. For K groups of J linear
functions, with strictly positive slopes wikj ∈ R>0, k = 1, . . . ,K, j = 1, . . . , J and intercepts
βikj ∈ R, k = 1, . . . ,K, j = 1, . . . , J , we define:
φ¯i(bi) = min
k∈[K]
max
j∈[J ]
wikj bi + β
i
kj .
Since each of the above linear function is strictly non-decreasing, so is φ¯i. In practice, we can set
each wikj = e
αikj for parameters αikj ∈ [−B,B] in a bounded range. A graphical representation of
the neural network used for this transform is shown in Figure 9(b). For sufficiently large K and J ,
this neural network can be used to approximate any continuous, bounded monotone function (that
satisfies a mild regularity condition) to an arbitrary degree of accuracy Sill [1998]. A particular
advantage of this representation is that the inverse transform φ¯−1 can be directly obtained from
the parameters for the forward transform:
φ¯−1i (y) = max
k∈[K]
min
j∈[J ]
e−α
i
kj (y − βikj).
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Figure 9: (a) MyersonNet: The network applies monotone transformations φ¯1, . . . , φ¯n to the input bids,
passes the virtual values to the SPA-0 network in Figure 10, and applies the inverse transformations
φ¯−11 , . . . , φ¯
−1
n to the payment outputs; (b) Monotone virtual value function φ¯i, where hkj(bi) = e
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Figure 10: SPA-0 network for (approximately) modeling a second price auction with zero reserve price.
The inputs are (virtual) bids b¯1, . . . , b¯n and the output is a vector of assignment probabilities z1, . . . , zn and
prices (conditioned on allocation) t01, . . . , t
0
n.
Modeling SPA with zero reserve. We also need to model a SPA with zero reserve (SPA-0)
within the neural network structure. A neural network is usually a continuous function of its
inputs, so that its parameters can be optimized efficiently. Since the allocation rule here is a
discrete mapping (from bidder bids to the winning bidder), for the purpose of training, we employ
a smooth approximation to the allocation rule using a neural network. Once we obtain the optimal
virtual value functions using the approximate allocation rule, we use them in conjunction with an
exact SPA with zero reserve, to construct the final mechanism.
The SPA-0 allocation rule g0 allocates the item to the bidder with the highest virtual value,
if the virtual value is greater than 0, and leaves the item unallocated otherwise. This can be
approximated using a ‘softmax’ function on the virtual values b¯1, . . . , b¯n and an additional dummy
input b¯n+1 = 0:
g0i (b¯) =
eκb¯i∑n+1
j=1 e
κb¯j
, i ∈ N, (14)
where κ > 0 is a constant fixed a priori, and determines the quality of the approximation. The
higher the value of κ, the better is the approximation, but the less smooth is the resulting allocation
function (and thus it becomes harder to optimize).
The SPA-0 payment to bidder i (conditioned on being allocated) is the maximum of the virtual
values from the other bidders, and zero:
t0i (b¯) = max
{
max
j 6=i
b¯j , 0
}
, i ∈ N. (15)
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Distribution n
Opt SPA MyersonNet
rev rev rev
Symmetric Uniform: vi ∼ U [0, 1] 3 0.531 0.500 0.531
Asymmetric Uniform: vi ∼ U [0, i] 5 2.314 2.025 2.305
Exponential: vi ∼ Exp(3) 3 2.749 2.500 2.747
Irregular: vi ∼ Firregular 3 2.368 2.210 2.355
Table 5: The revenue of the single-item auctions obtained with RegretNet.
Let gα,β and tα,β denote the allocation and conditional payment rules for the overall mechanism
in Figure 9(a), where (α, β) are the parameters of the forward monotone transform. Given a sample
of valuation profiles S = {v(1), . . . , v(L)} drawn i.i.d. from F , we optimize the parameters using the
(negative) revenue on S as the error function:
r̂ev(f, p) =
1
L
L∑
`=1
n∑
i=1
gα,βi (v
(`)) tα,βi (v
(`)). (16)
We solve this optimization problem using a mini-batch stochastic gradient descent solver.
B.1 Experimental Results for MyersonNet
We evaluate the MyersonNet for designing single-item auctions on three regular distributions: (a)
symmetric uniform distribution with 3 bidders and each vi ∼ U [0, 1], (b) asymmetric uniform
distribution with 5 bidders and each vi ∼ U [0, i], and (c) exponential distribution with 3 bidders
and each vi ∼ Exp(3). We study auctions with a small number of bidders because this is where
revenue-optimal auctions are meaningfully different from efficient auctions. The optimal auctions
for these distributions involve virtual value functions φ¯i that are strictly monotone. We also consider
an irregular distribution Firregular, where each vi is drawn from U [0, 3] with probability 3/4 and
from U [3, 8] with probability 1/4. In this case, the optimal auction uses ironed virtual value
functions that are not strictly monotone. The training set and test set each have 1000 valuation
profiles, sampled i.i.d. from the respective valuation distribution. We model each transform φ¯i in
the MyersonNet architecture using 5 sets of 10 linear functions, and set κ = 103.
The results are summarized in Table 5. For comparison, we also report the revenue obtained
by the optimal Myerson auction and the second price auction (SPA) without reserve. The auctions
learned by the neural network yield revenue close to the optimal.
The monotone virtual value transform inferred by the neural network for each bidder is shown
in Figure 11. It can be verified that two auctions with virtual value transforms φ¯1, . . . , φ¯n and
φ¯′1, . . . , φ¯′n are equivalent if for each bidder i, φ¯i and φ¯′i have the same zero intercept, and there exists
a scalar γ > 0 such that for each bidder i, φ¯i(x) = γ φ¯
′
i(x) for all x above the zero intercept. With
the symmetric uniform and exponential distributions, the learned transform for each bidder has
the same zero intercept as the optimal transform for the bidder. Also, the learned transforms have
very similar slopes above the zero intercept. This is also seen with most agents in the asymmetric
uniform setting, where the learned transform above the zero intercept has almost the same slope
as the optimal transform. This indicates that the learned auctions for these distributions closely
resemble the optimal auctions.
With the irregular distribution, the learned transform for each bidder has almost the same zero
intercept as the optimal transform, but the learned transforms above the zero intercept are not
all the same scalar multiple of the optimal transform. However notice that the learned transforms
closely mimic the ironed flat portion of the optimal transform (albeit with a small non-zero slope
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Figure 11: Virtual value transformations learned by MyersonNet for each agent and of the optimal auction.
The zero intercepts of most of the learned transforms are close to that of the optimal transforms. In many
cases, the slopes of the learned transforms above the zero intercept are roughly a positive scalar multiple of
the optimal transform, with the scalar being almost the same across agents.
because of the strictness imposed on the transforms by the network architecture). The slight
mismatch between the learned and optimal transforms possibly explains why the revenue of the
learned auction is not as close to the optimal revenue as that for the other distributions.
C Visualization of Gradient-Based Regret Approximation
In Section 4, we described a gradient-based approach to estimating a bidder’s regret. We present
a visualization of this approach in Figure 12 for a well-trained mechanism for Setting (I) with zero
regret. We consider bidder with valuation (v1, v2) = (0.1, 0.8) (represented as a green dot). The
heat map represents the utility difference u((v1, v2); (b1, b2)) − u((v1, v2); (v1, v2)) for misreports
(b1, b2) ∈ [0, 1]2, with shades of yellow corresponding to low utility differences and shades of blue
corresponding high utility differences. To estimate the regret of the bidder for the trained auction
(which is zero in this case), we draw 10 random initial misreports from the underlying valuation
distribution (marked with red dots) and then perform a sequence of gradient-descent steps on these
random misreports. The figure shows the random misreports (top left) and then the 22 gradient-
descent steps (skipping every other). In this case, after 40–50 updates all misreports converge to
the truthful bid, where the utility difference is zero.
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Figure 12: Schematic representation of the gradient-based approach to regret approximation for a well-
trained auction for Setting (I). The top left plot shows the true valuation (green dot) and ten random
misreports (red dots). The remaining plots show the 22 steps (skipping every other) of the gradient descent.
In this case, all misreports will have converged to the truthful bid after 40-50 updates.
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Algorithm 2 RegretNet Training for Sample-Based Approximate Regret
Input: Minibatches S1, . . . ,ST of size B, and misreports S(`)i for each i, `
Parameters: ∀t, ρt > 0, η > 0, R ∈ N, Z ∈ N
Initialize: w0 ∈ Rd, λ0 ∈ Rn
for t = 0 to T do
Receive minibatch St = {u(1), . . . , u(B)}
Compute regret gradient: ∀` ∈ [B], i ∈ N :
gt`,i = ∇w
[
max
v′i∈S(`)i
uwi
(
v
(`)
i ;
(
v′(`)i , v
(`)
−i
))− uwi (v(`)i ; v(`))] ∣∣∣
w=wt
Compute Lagrangian gradient using (5) and update wt:
wt+1 ← wt − η∇w Cρt(wt, λt)
Update Lagrange multipliers once in Z iterations:
if t is a multiple of Z
λt+1i ← λti + ρt r˜gt i(wt+1), ∀i ∈ N
else
λt+1 ← λt
end for
Distribution
Opt RegretNet (Algorithm 2)
rev rev rgt
Setting (I) 0.550 0.557 < 0.001
Setting (II) 9.781 9.722 < 0.003
Setting (III) 0.388 0.392 < 0.001
Setting (IV) 0.384 0.386 < 0.001
Setting (V) 2.137 2.124 < 0.001
Table 6: Test revenue and regret for Settings (I)-(V), learned by RegretNet using the sample-based approach
to approximate the max over misreports. The optimal mechanisms for these settings are known.
D Sample-Based Approach for Optimization in RegretNet
In this appendix we present an alternative approach for computing the “max” over misreports that
shows up in the regret term. In this solver, we compute the empirical regret approximately by
replacing the max over misreports in the definition by a max over a sample of misreport profiles
drawn uniformly from each Vi. Given a sample of L valuation profiles S drawn i.i.d. from F , and
a sample of misreport profiles S
(`)
i drawn uniformly from Vi for each bidder i ∈ N and each profile
v(`) ∈ S, we define the approximate empirical regret for bidder i as:
r˜gti(w) =
1
L
L∑
`=1
max
v′i∈S(`)i
(
uwi
(
v
(`)
i ; (v
′
i, v
(`)
−i )
)− uwi (v(`)i ; v(`))) , (17)
where uwi (vi, b) = vi(g
w
i (b))− pwi (b).
The solver is shown in Algorithm 2. We first give a generalization bound for this approach. We
then give the experimental results from using this solver, and compare them with the results from
using the gradient-based approach for misreports, as provided in Section 5.
D.1 Generalization Bound
We state a bound on the gap between the expected ex post regret and the approximate empirical
regret in (17) in terms of the number of valuation profiles in S and the number of misreport profiles
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Distribution
RegretNet (Algorithm 2) VVCA AMAbsym
rev rgt rev rev
Setting (VI) 0.880 < 0.001 0.860 0.862
Setting (VII) 2.862 < 0.001 2.741 2.765
Setting (VIII) 4.236 < 0.001 4.209 3.748
Table 7: Test revenue and regret for settings (VI)-(VIII), learned by RegretNet using sample-based approach
to approximate the max over misreports. The state-of-the-art computational results is provided by Sandholm
and Likhodedov [2015] and we compare our RegretNet with the two optimal auctions from the VVCA and
AMAbsym families from Sandholm and Likhodedov [2015].
in S(`).
Theorem 7. For each bidder i, assume w.l.o.g. the valuation function vi(S) ≤ 1, ∀S ⊆M . Let M
be a class of auctions (gw, pw) that satisfy individual rationality, where the allocation and payment
functions satisfy the following Lipschitz property: for all i ∈ N, v′i, v′′i ∈ V, v−i ∈ V−i, ‖gwi (v′i, v−i)−
gwi (v
′′
i , v−i)‖1 ≤ L‖v′i − v′′i ‖∞ and |pwi (v′i, v−i) − pwi (v′′i , v−i)| ≤ L‖v′i − v′′i ‖∞. Fix δ ∈ (0, 1). With
probability at least 1 − δ over draw of sample S of L profiles from F and draw of each misreport
sample S
(`)
i of size Q from a uniform distribution over V , for any (g
w, pw) ∈M,
rgti(w)− r˜gti(w) ≤ 2∆˜L + C
√
log(n/δ)
L ,
∆˜L := inf>0
(
+ 2
(
2 log(N∞(M,/2))
L
)1/2
+ 2L
(
log(2nLN∞(M,/4)/δ)
Q
)1/D)
where D = maxi∈N dim(Vi), dim(Vi) is the dimension of each valuation in Vi, and C is a distribution-
independent constant.
Upper bounding the ’inf’ over  the same way we bounded the term ∆L in Theorem 2, we have
the following corollary to bound ∆˜L.
Corollary 1. For RegretNet with R hidden layers, K nodes per hidden layer, da parameters in the
allocation network, dp parameters in the payment network, and the vector of all model parameters
‖w‖1 ≤W , the term ∆˜L in Theorem 7 for different bidder valuation types can be bounded as follows,
(a) additive valuations:
∆˜L ≤ O(
√
R(da + dp)
log(LW max{K,mn})
L
+ L ·
(
R(da + dp)
log(LW max{K,mn}/δ)
Q
)1/D
),
(b) unit-demand valuations:
∆˜L ≤ O(
√
R(da + dp)
log(LW max{K,mn}/δ)
L
+L ·
(
R(da+dp)
log(LW max{K,mn}/δ)
Q
)1/D
),
(c) combinatorial valuations:
∆˜L ≤ O(
√
R(da + dp)
log(LW max{K,n 2m}/δ)
L
+L·
(
R(da+dp)
log(LW max{K,n 2m}/δ)
Q
)1/D
).
The proof of Theorem 7 is given in Appendix F.4.
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Figure 13: Allocation rules learned by RegretNet with Algorithm 2 as the solver, for single-bidder, two
items settings: (a) Setting (I), (b) Setting (II), (c) Setting (III), (d) Setting (IV), and (e) Setting (V). The
solid regions describe the probability that the bidder is allocated item 1 (left) and item 2 (right) for different
valuation inputs. The optimal auctions are described by the regions separated by the dashed black lines,
with the numbers in black the optimal probability of allocation in the region.
D.2 Experiments with Sample-Based Approach
Setup and evaluation. For all the experiments in this section, we generate 100 misreports from
a uniform distribution for each valuation profile (i.e. |S(`)i | = 100,∀i, `) in the training data. All the
other setups and evaluation are the same as in the experiments that make use of the gradient-based
approach to misreports (Section 5).
Experimental results. First, we consider the smaller settings described in Section 5 ((I)-(VIII))
and report the test revenue and regret of the final auctions learned for these settings, adopting an
architecture with two hidden layers and 100 nodes per layer. The results are summarized in Table 6
and Table 7. We find that for these settings using the sample-based approach (Algorithm 2) yields
comparable results to the gradient-based approach. However, the training time is much smaller,
with Algorithm 2 taking less than two hours for these settings, giving a 4× speed up compared to
Algorithm 1. From the visualizations of the learned allocation rules for Settings (I)-(V), shown in
Figure 13, we can see this alternate approach also closely recover the optimal structure.
On the other hand, for larger settings (e.g. Settings (IX) - (XI)), the regret obtained using
Algorithm 2 is higher than the regret obtained using Algorithm 1 (with the gradient-based approach
to regret). This is because the number of misreports that we sample is not sufficient to accurately
estimate the regret for these higher dimensional settings.
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Discussion. The sample-based approach is faster than the gradient-based approach for smaller
settings, while achieving comparable results. The sample-based approach is also particularly useful
for settings where the utility function is not differentiable (e.g., settings with discrete values).
However, this approach does not scale well to higher dimensional settings.
E Augmented Lagrangian Method for Constrained Optimization
We give a brief description of the Augmented Lagrangian method for solving constrained optimiza-
tion problems [Bertsekas, 2014]. We use this method for solving neural network training problems
involving equality constraints.
Consider the following optimization problem with s equality constraints:
min
w∈Rd
C(w) (18)
s.t. gj(w) = 0, ∀j = 1, . . . , s.
The augmented Lagrangian method formulates an unconstrained objective, involving the La-
grangian for the above problem, augmented with additional quadratic penalty terms that penalize
violations in the equality constraints:
Cρ(w, λ) = C(w) +
s∑
j=1
λjgj(w) +
ρ
2
s∑
j=1
(gj(w))
2,
where λ = [λ1, . . . , λs] is a vector of Lagrange multipliers associated with the equality constraints,
and ρ > 0 is a parameter that controls the weight on the penalty terms for violating the constraints.
The method then performs the following sequence of updates:
wt+1 ∈ argminw∈Rd Cρ(w, λt) (19)
λt+1j = λ
t
j + ρ gj(w
t+1). (20)
One can set the penalty parameter ρ to a very large value (i.e. set a high cost for violating
the equality constraints), so that method converges to a (locally) optimal solution to the original
constrained problem (18). However, in practice, this can lead to numerical issues in applying the
solver updates. Alternatively, the theory shows that under some conditions on the iterates of the
solver, any value of ρ above a certain threshold will take the solver close to a locally optimal solution
to (18) (see e.g. Theorem 17.6 in [Wright and Nocedal, 1999]).
In our experiments, we apply the augmented Lagrangian method to solve neural network revenue
optimization problems, where we implement the inner optimization within the solver updates using
mini-batch stochastic subgradient descent. We find that even for small values of ρ, with sufficient
number of iterations, the solver converges to auction designs that yield near-optimal revenue while
closely satisfying the regret constraints (see experimental results in Sections 5).
Finally, we point out that the described method can also be applied to optimization problems
with inequality constraints hj(w) ≤ 0 by formulating equivalent equality constraints of the form
max{0, hj(w)} = 0.
31
F Omitted Proofs
F.1 Proofs of Lemma 1 and Lemma 2
Proof of Lemma 1. First, given the property of Softmax function and the min operation, ϕDS(s, s′)
ensures that the row sums and column sums for the resulting allocation matrix do not exceed 1.
In fact, for any doubly stochastic allocation z, there exists scores s and s′, for which the min of
normalized scores recovers z (e.g. sij = s
′
ij = log(zij) + c for any c ∈ R).
Proof of Lemma 2. Similar to Lemma 1, ϕCF (s, s(1), . . . , s(m)) trivially satisfies the combinatorial
feasibility (constraints (3)–(4)). For any allocation z that satisfies the combinatorial feasibility, the
following scores
∀j = 1, · · · ,m, si,S = s(j)i,S = log(zi,S) + c,
makes ϕCF (s, s(1), . . . , s(m)) recover z.
F.2 Proof of Theorem 1
We present the proof for auctions with general, randomized allocation rules. A randomized alloca-
tion rule gi : V → [0, 1]2M maps valuation profiles to a vector of allocation probabilities for bidder
i. Here gi,S(v) ∈ [0, 1] denote the probability that the allocation rule assigns subset of items S ⊆M
to bidder i, and
∑
S⊆M gi,S(v) ≤ 1. Note that this encompasses the allocation rules we consider
for additive and unit-demand valuations, which only output allocation probabilities for individual
items. The payment function p : V → Rn maps valuation profiles to a payment for each bidder
pi(v) ∈ R. For ease of exposition, we omit the superscripts “w”. As before,M is a class of auctions
(g, p).
We will assume that the allocation and payment rules in M are continuous and that the set of
valuation profiles V is a compact set.
Notations. For any vectors a, b ∈ Rd, the inner product is denoted as 〈a, b〉 = ∑di=1 aibi. For
any matrix A ∈ Rk×`, the L1 norm is given by ‖A‖1 = max1≤j≤`
∑k
i=1Aij .
Let Ui be the class of utility functions for bidder i defined on auctions in M, i.e.:
Ui =
{
ui : Vi × V → R
∣∣ui(vi, b) = vi(g(b)) − pi(b) for some (g, p) ∈M}.
and let U be the class of profile of utility functions defined onM, i.e. the class of tuples (u1, . . . , un)
where each ui : Vi × V → R and ui(vi, b) = vi(g(b)) − pi(b),∀i ∈ N for some (g, p) ∈ M. We will
sometimes find it useful to represent the utility function as an inner product, i.e. treating vi as a
real-valued vector of length 2M , we may write ui(vi, b) = 〈vi, gi(b)〉 − pi(b).
Let rgt ◦ Ui be the class of all regret functions for bidder i defined on utility functions in Ui:
rgt ◦ Ui =
{
fi : V → R
∣∣∣ fi(v) = max
v′i
ui(vi, (v
′
i, v−i)) − ui(vi, v) for some ui ∈ Ui
}
and as before, let rgt ◦ U be defined as the class of profiles of regret functions.
Define the `∞,1 distance between two utility functions u and u′ as maxv,v′
∑
i |ui(vi, (v′i, v−i))−
ui(vi, (v
′
i, v−i))| and N∞(U , ) is the minimum number of balls of radius  to cover U under this dis-
tance. Similarly, define the distance between ui and u
′
i as maxv,v′i |ui(vi, (v′i, v−i))−u′i(vi, (v′i, v−i))|,
and let N∞(Ui, ) denote the minimum number of balls of radius  to coverUi under this distance.
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Similarly, we define covering numbers N∞(rgt ◦ Ui, ) and N∞(rgt ◦ U , ) for the function classes
rgt ◦ Ui and rgt ◦ U respectively.
Moreover, we denote the class of allocation functions as G and for each bidder i, Gi = {gi : V →
2M | g ∈ G}. Similarly, we denote the class of payment functions by P and Pi = {pi : V → R | p ∈
P}. We denote the covering number of P as N∞(P, ) under the `∞,1 distance and the covering
number for Pi using N∞(Pi, ) under the `∞ distance.
We would find it useful to first state the following lemma from Shalev-Shwartz and Ben-David
[2014]. Let F be a class of functions f : Z → [−c, c] for some input space Z and c > 0. Given a
sample S = {z1, . . . , zL} of points from Z, define the empirical Rademacher Complexity of F as:
RˆL(F) := 1
L
Eσ
sup
f∈F
∑
zi∈S
σif(zi)
 ,
where σ ∈ {−1, 1}L and each σi is drawn i.i.d from a uniform distribution on {−1, 1}.
Lemma 3 (Generalization bound in terms of Rademacher complexity). Let S = {z1, . . . , zL} be a
sample drawn i.i.d. from some distribution D over Z. Then with probability of at least 1− δ over
draw of S from D, for all f ∈ F ,
Ez∈D[f(z)] ≤ 1
L
L∑
i=1
f(zi) + 2RˆL(F) + 4c
√
2 log(4/δ)
L
.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 1. We begin with the first part, namely a generalization
bound for revenue.
F.2.1 Generalization Bound for Revenue
Proof of Theorem 1 (Part 1).
The proof involves a direct application of Lemma 3 to the class of revenue functions defined on
M:
rev ◦M = {f : V → R ∣∣ f(v) = ∑ni=1 pi(v), for some (g, p) ∈M}.
and bound the Rademacher complexity term for this class first in terms of the covering number for
the payment class P, which in turn is bounded by the covering number for the auction class forM.
Since we assume that the auction inM satisfy individual rationality and the valuation functions
are bounded in [0, 1], we have for any v, pi(v) ≤ 1. By definition of the covering number N∞(P, )
for the payment class, for any p ∈ P, there exists a fp ∈ Pˆ where |Pˆ| ≤ N∞(P, ), such that
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maxv
∑
i |pi(v)− fpi(v)| ≤ . First we bound the Rademacher Complexity, for a given  ∈ (0, 1),
RˆL(rev ◦M) = 1
L
Eσ
[
sup
p
L∑
`=1
σ` ·
∑
i
pi(v
(`))
]
=
1
L
Eσ
[
sup
p
L∑
`=1
σ` ·
∑
i
fpi(v
(`))
]
+
1
L
Eσ
[
sup
p
L∑
`=1
σ` ·
∑
i
pi(v
(`))− fpi(v(`))
]
≤ 1
L
Eσ
[
sup
pˆ∈Pˆ
L∑
`=1
σ` ·
∑
i
pˆi(v
(`))
]
+
1
L
Eσ‖σ‖1
≤
√∑
`
(
∑
i
pˆi(v`))2
√
2 log(N∞(P, ))
L
+  (By Massart’s Lemma)
≤ 2n
√
2 log(N∞(P, ))
L
+ 
The last inequality is because√√√√∑
`
(∑
i
pˆi(v`)
)2
≤
√√√√∑
`
(∑
i
pi(v`) + n
)2
≤ 2n
√
L
Next we show N∞(P, ) ≤ N∞(M, ), for any (g, p) ∈M, take (gˆ, pˆ) s.t. for all v∑
i,j
|gij(v)− gˆij(v)|+
∑
i
|pi(v)− pˆi(v)| ≤ 
Thus for any p ∈ P, for all v, ∑i |pi(v) − pˆi(v)| ≤ , which implies N∞(P, ) ≤ N∞(M, ).
Applying Lemma 3 and
∑
i pi(v) ≤ n for any v, with probability of at least 1− δ,
Ev∼F
[
−
∑
i∈N
pi(v)
]
≤ − 1
L
L∑
`=1
n∑
i=1
pi(v
(`)) + 2 · inf
>0
{
+ 2n
√
2 log(N∞(M, ))
L
}
+ Cn
√
log(1/δ)
L
This completes the proof for the first part.
F.2.2 Generalization Bound for Regret
Proof of Theorem 1 (Part 2).
We move to the second part, namely a generalization bound for regret, which is the more
challenging part of the proof. We first define the class of sum regret functions:
rgt ◦ U =
{
f : V → R
∣∣∣∣ f(v) = n∑
i=1
ri(v) for some (r1, . . . , rn) ∈ rgt ◦ U
}
.
The proof then proceeds in three steps:
(1) bounding the covering number for each regret class rgt ◦Ui in terms of the covering number
for individual utility classes Ui
(2) bounding the covering number for the combined utility class U in terms of the covering
number for M
(3) bounding the covering number for the sum regret class rgt ◦ U in terms of the covering
number for the (combined) utility class M.
An application of Lemma 3 then completes the proof. We prove each of the above steps below.
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Step 1. N∞(rgt ◦ Ui, ) ≤ N∞(Ui, /2).
By definition of covering number N∞(Ui, ), there exists Uˆi with size at most N∞(Ui, /2) such
that for any ui ∈ Ui, there exists a uˆi ∈ Uˆi with
sup
v,v′i
|ui(vi, (v′i, v−i))− uˆi(vi, (v′i, v−i))| ≤ /2.
For any ui ∈ Ui, taking uˆi ∈ Uˆi satisfying the above condition, then for any v,∣∣∣∣max
v′i∈V
(
ui(vi, (v
′
i, v−i))− ui(vi, (vi, v−i))
)−max
v¯i∈V
(
uˆi(vi, (v¯i, v−i))− uˆi(vi, (vi, v−i))
)∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣max
v′i
ui(vi, (v
′
i, v−i))−maxv¯i uˆi(vi, (v¯i, v−i)) + uˆi(vi, (vi, v−i))− ui(vi, (vi, v−i))
∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣max
v′i
ui(vi, (v
′
i, v−i))−maxv¯i uˆi(vi, (v¯i, v−i))
∣∣∣∣+ |uˆi(vi, (vi, v−i))− ui(vi, (vi, v−i))|
≤
∣∣∣∣max
v′i
ui(vi, (v
′
i, v−i))−maxv¯i uˆi(vi, (v¯i, v−i))
∣∣∣∣+ /2
Let v∗i ∈ arg maxv′i ui(vi, (v′i, v−i)) and vˆ∗i ∈ arg maxv¯i uˆi(vi, (v¯i, v−i)), then
max
v′i
ui(vi, (v
′
i, v−i)) = ui(v
∗
i , v−i) ≤ uˆi(v∗i , v−i) + /2 ≤ uˆi(vˆ∗i , v−i) + /2 = maxv¯i uˆi(vi, (v¯i, v−i)) + /2
max
v¯i
uˆi(vi, (v¯i, v−i)) = uˆi(vˆ∗i , v−i) ≤ ui(vˆ∗i , v−i) + /2 ≤ ui(v∗i , v−i) + /2 = max
v′i
ui(vi, (v
′
i, v−i)) + /2
(21)
Thus, for all ui ∈ Ui, there exists uˆi ∈ Uˆi such that for any valuation profile v∣∣∣∣max
v′i
(
ui(vi, (v
′
i, v−i))− ui(vi, (vi, v−i))
)−max
v¯i
(
uˆi(vi, (v¯i, v−i))− uˆi(vi, (vi, v−i))
)∣∣∣∣ ≤ 
which implies N∞(rgt ◦ Ui, ) ≤ N∞(Ui, /2).
This completes the proof for Step 1.
Step 2. N∞(U , ) ≤ N∞(M, ), for all i ∈ N .
Recall the utility function of bidder i is ui(vi, (v
′
i, v−i)) = 〈vi, gi(v′i, v−i)〉 − pi(v′i, v−i). There
exists a set Mˆ with |Mˆ| ≤ N∞(M, ) such that, there exists (gˆ, pˆ) ∈ Mˆ s.t.
sup
v∈V
∑
i,j
|gij(v)− gˆij(v)|+ ‖p(v)− pˆ(v)‖1 ≤ 
We denote uˆi(vi, (v
′
i, v−i)) = 〈vi, gˆi(v′i, v−i)〉 − pˆi(v′i, v−i), where we treat vi as a real-valued vector
of length 2M
For all v ∈ V, v′i ∈ Vi,∣∣ui(vi, (v′i, v−i))− uˆi(vi, (v′i, v−i))∣∣
≤ ∣∣〈vi, gi(v′i, v−i)〉 − 〈vi, gˆi(v′i, v−i)〉∣∣+ ∣∣pi(v′i, v−i)− pˆi(v′i, v−i)∣∣
≤ ‖vi‖∞ · ‖gi(v′i, v−i)− gˆi(v′i, v−i)‖1 +
∣∣pi(v′i, v−i)− pˆi(v′i, v−i)∣∣
≤
∑
j
|gij(v′i, v−i)− gˆij(v′i, v−i)|+
∣∣pi(v′i, v−i)− pˆi(v′i, v−i)∣∣
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Therefore, for any u ∈ U , take uˆ = (gˆ, pˆ) ∈ Mˆ, for all v, v′,∑
i
|ui(vi,(v′i, v−i))− uˆi(vi, (v′i, v−i))|
≤
∑
ij
|gij(v′i, v−i)− gˆij(v′i, v−i)|+
∑
i
∣∣pi(v′i, v−i)− pˆi(v′i, v−i)∣∣ ≤ 
This completes the proof for Step 2.
Step 3. N∞(rgt ◦ U , ) ≤ N∞(M, /2)
By definition of N∞(U , ), there exists Uˆ with size at most N∞(U , ), such that, for any u ∈ U ,
there exists uˆ s.t. for all v, v′ ∈ V , ∑i |ui(vi, (v′i, v−i)) − uˆi(vi, (v′i, v−i))| ≤ . Therefore for all
v ∈ V , |∑i ui(vi, (v′i, v−i)) −∑i uˆi(vi, (v′i, v−i))| ≤ , from which it follows that N∞(rgt ◦ U , ) ≤
N∞(rgt◦U , ). Following Step 1, it is easy to show N∞(rgt◦U , ) ≤ N∞(U , /2). This further with
Step 2 completes the proof of Step 3.
Based on the same arguments in Section F.2.1, the empirical Rademacher Complexity is bounded
as:
RˆL(rgt ◦ U) ≤ inf
>0
(
+ 2n
√
2 logN∞(rgt ◦ U , )
L
)
≤ inf
>0
(
+ 2n
√
2 logN∞(M, /2)
L
)
Applying Lemma 3, completes the proof for generalization bound for regret.
F.3 Proof of Theorem 2
We first bound the covering number for a general feed-forward neural network and specialize it to
the three architectures we present in Section 3.
Lemma 4. Let Fk be a class of feed-forward neural networks that maps an input vector x ∈ Rd0
to an output vector y ∈ Rdk , with each layer ` containing T` nodes and computing z 7→ φ`(w`z),
where each w` ∈ RT`×T`−1 and φ` : RT` → [−B,+B]T`. Further let, for each network in Fk, let the
parameter matrices ‖w`‖1 ≤W and ‖φ`(s)− φ`(s′)‖1 ≤ Φ‖s− s′‖1 for any s, s′ ∈ RT`−1.
N∞(Fk, ) ≤
⌈
2Bd2W (2ΦW )k

⌉d
,
where T = max`∈[k] T` and d is the total number of parameters in a network.
Proof. We shall construct an `1,∞ cover for Fk by discretizing each of the d parameters along
[−W,+W ] at scale 0/d, where we will choose 0 > 0 at the end of the proof. We will use Fˆk
to denote the subset of neural networks in Fk whose parameters are in the range {−(dWd/0e −
1) 0/d, . . . ,−0/d, 0, 0/d, . . . , dWd/0e0/d}. Note that size of Fˆk is at most d2dW/0ed. We shall
now show that Fˆk is an -cover for Fk.
We use mathematical induction on the number of layers k. We wish to show that for any f ∈ Fk
there exists a fˆ ∈ Fˆk such that:
‖f(x)− fˆ(x)‖1 ≤ Bd0(2ΦW )k.
Note that for k = 0, the statement holds trivially. Assume that the statement is true for Fk. We
now show that the statement holds for Fk+1.
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A function f ∈ Fk+1 can be written as f(z) = φk+1(wk+1H(z)) for some H ∈ Fk. Similarly,
a function fˆ ∈ Fˆk+1 can be written as fˆ(z) = φk+1(wˆk+1Hˆ(z)) for some Hˆ ∈ Fˆk and wˆk+1 is a
matrix of entries in {−(dWd/0e−1) 0/d, . . . ,−0/d, 0, 0/d, . . . , dWd/0e0/d}. Also note that for
any parameter matrix w` ∈ RT`×T`−1 , there is a matrix wˆ` with discrete entries s.t.
‖w` − wˆ`‖1 = max
1≤j≤T`−1
T∑`
i=1
|w``,i,j − wˆ`,i,j | ≤ T`0/d ≤ 0. (22)
We then have:
‖f(x)− fˆ(x)‖1 = ‖φk+1(wk+1H(x))− φk+1(wˆk+1Hˆ(x))‖1
≤ Φ‖wk+1H(x)− wˆk+1Hˆ(x)‖1
≤ Φ‖wk+1H(x)− wk+1Hˆ(x)‖1 + Φ‖wk+1Hˆ(x)− wˆk+1Hˆ(x)‖1
≤ Φ‖wk+1‖1 · ‖H(x)− Hˆ(x)‖1 + Φ‖wk+1 − wˆk+1‖1 · ‖Hˆ(x)‖1
≤ ΦW‖H(x)− Hˆ(x)‖1 + ΦB‖wk+1 − wˆk+1‖1
≤ Bd0ΦW (2ΦW )k + ΦBd0
≤ Bd0(2ΦW )k+1,
where the second line follows from our assumption on φk+1, and the sixth line follows from our
inductive hypothesis and from (22). By choosing 0 =

B(2ΦW )k
, we complete the proof.
We next bound the covering number of the mechanism class in terms of the covering number
for the class of allocation networks and for the class of payment networks. Recall that the payment
networks computes a fraction α : Rm(n+1) → [0, 1]n and computes a payment pi(b) = αi(b)·〈vi, gi(b)〉
for each bidder i. Let G be the class of allocation networks and A be the class of fractional payment
functions used to construct auctions in M. Let N∞(G, ) and N∞(A, ) be the corresponding
covering numbers w.r.t. the `∞ norm. Then:
Lemma 5. N∞(M, ) ≤ N∞(G, /3) · N∞(A, /3)
Proof. Let Gˆ ⊆ G, Aˆ ⊆ A be `∞ covers for G and A, i.e. for any g ∈ G and α ∈ A, there exists
gˆ ∈ Gˆ and αˆ ∈ Aˆ with
sup
b
∑
i,j
|gij(b)− gˆij(b)| ≤ /3 (23)
sup
b
∑
i
|αi(b)− αˆi(b)| ≤ /3. (24)
We now show that the class of mechanism Mˆ = {(gˆ, αˆ) | gˆ ∈ Gˆ, and pˆ(b) = αˆi(b) · 〈vi, gˆi(b)〉} is
an -cover for M under the `1,∞ distance. For any mechanism in (g, p) ∈ M, let (gˆ, pˆ) ∈ Mˆ be a
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mechanism in Mˆ that satisfies (24). We have:∑
i,j
|gij(b)− gˆij(b)|+
∑
i
|pi(b)− pˆi(b)|
≤ /3 +
∑
i
|αi(b) · 〈bi, gi,·(b)〉 − αˆi(b) · 〈bi, gˆi(b)〉|
≤ /3 +
∑
i
|(αi(b)− αˆi(b)) · 〈bi, gi(b)〉|+ |αˆi(b) · (〈bi, gi(b)〉 − 〈bi, gˆi,·(b))〉|
≤ /3 +
∑
i
|αi(b)− αˆi(b)|+
∑
i
‖bi‖∞ · ‖gi(b)− gˆi(b)‖1
≤ 2/3 +
∑
i,j
|gij(b)− gˆij(b)| ≤ ,
where in the third inequality we use 〈bi, gi(b)〉 ≤ 1. The size of the cover Mˆ is |Gˆ||Aˆ|, which
completes the proof.
We are now ready to prove covering number bounds for the three architectures in Section 3.
Proof of Theorem 2. All three architectures use the same feed-forward architecture for computing
fractional payments, consisting of K hidden layers with tanh activation functions. We also have
by our assumption that the L1 norm of the vector of all model parameters is at most W , for each
` = 1, . . . , R+1, ‖w`‖1 ≤W . Using that fact that the tanh activation functions are 1-Lipschitz and
bounded in [−1, 1], and there are at most max{K,n} number of nodes in any layer of the payment
network, we have by an application of Lemma 4 the following bound on the covering number of the
fractional payment networks A used in each case:
N∞(A, ) ≤
⌈
max(K,n)2(2W )R+1

⌉dp
where dp is the number of parameters in payment networks.
For the covering number of allocation networks G, we consider each architecture separately. In
each case, we bound the Lipschitz constant for the activation functions used in the layers of the
allocation network and followed by an application of Lemma 4. For ease of exposition, we omit the
dummy scores used in the final layer of neural network architectures.
Additive bidders. The output layer computes n allocation probabilities for each item j using
a softmax function. The activation function φR+1 : Rn → Rn for the final layer for input s ∈
Rn×m can be described as: φR+1(s) = [softmax(s1,1, . . . , sn,1), . . . , softmax(s1,m, . . . , sn,m)], where
softmax : Rn → [0, 1]n is defined for any u ∈ Rn as softmaxi(u) = exp(ui)/
∑n
k=1 exp(uk).
We then have for any s, s′ ∈ Rn×m,
‖φR+1(s)− φR+1(s′)‖1 =
∑
j
∥∥softmax(s1,j , . . . , sn,j)− softmax(s′1,j , . . . , s′n,j)∥∥1
≤ √n
∑
j
∥∥softmax(s1,j , . . . , sn,j)− softmax(s′1,j , . . . , s′n,j)∥∥2
≤ √n
√
n− 1
n
∑
j
√∑
i
‖sij − s′ij‖2
≤
∑
j
∑
i
|sij − s′ij | (25)
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where the third step follows by bounding the Frobenius norm of the Jacobian of the softmax
function.
The hidden layers ` = 1, . . . , R are standard feed-forward layers with tanh activations. Since the
tanh activation function is 1-Lipschitz, ‖φ`(s)−φ`(s′)‖1 ≤ ‖s−s′‖1. We also have by our assumption
that the L1 norm of the vector of all model parameters is at most W , for each ` = 1, . . . , R + 1,
‖w`‖1 ≤ W . Moreover, the output of each hidden layer node is in [−1, 1], the output layer nodes
is in [0, 1], and the maximum number of nodes in any layer (including the output layer) is at most
max{K,mn}.
By an application of Lemma 4 with Φ = 1, B = 1 and d = maxK,mn, we have
N∞(G, ) ≤
⌈
max{K,mn}2(2W )R+1

⌉da
,
where da is the number of parameters in allocation networks.
Unit-demand bidders. The output layer n allocation probabilities for each item j as an element-
wise minimum of two softmax functions. The activation function φR+1 : R2n → Rn for the final
layer for two sets of scores s, s¯ ∈ Rn×m can be described as:
φR+1,i,j(s, s
′) = min{softmaxj(si,1, . . . , si,m), softmaxi(s′1,j , . . . , s′n,j)}.
We then have for any s, s˜, s′, s˜′ ∈ Rn×m,
‖φR+1(s, s˜)− φR+1(s′, s˜′)‖1 =
∑
i,j
∣∣∣min{softmaxj(si,1, . . . , si,m), softmaxi(s˜1,j , . . . , s˜n,j)}
− min{softmaxj(s′i,1, . . . , s′i,m), softmaxi(s˜′1,j , . . . , s˜′n,j)}
∣∣∣
≤
∑
i,j
∣∣∣max{softmaxj(si,1, . . . , si,m) − softmaxj(s′i,1, . . . , s′i,m),
softmaxi(s˜1,j , . . . , s˜n,j) − softmaxi(s˜′1,j , . . . , s˜′n,j)}
∣∣∣
≤
∑
i
∥∥softmax(si,1, . . . , si,m) − softmax(s′i,1, . . . , s′i,m)∥∥1
+
∑
j
∥∥softmax(s˜1,j , . . . , s˜n,j) − softmax(s˜′1,j , . . . , s˜′n,j)}∥∥1
≤
∑
i,j
|sij − s′ij | +
∑
i,j
|s˜ij − s˜′ij |,
where the last step can be derived in the same way as (25).
As with additive bidders, using additionally hidden layers ` = 1, . . . , R are standard feed-forward
layers with tanh activations, we have from Lemma 4 with Φ = 1, B = 1 and d = max{K,mn},
N∞(G, ) ≤
⌈
max{K,mn}2(2W )R+1

⌉da
.
Combinatorial bidders. The output layer outputs an allocation probability for each bidder i
and bundle of items S ⊆ M . The activation function φR+1 : R(m+1)n2m → Rn2m for this layer for
m+ 1 sets of scores s, s(1), . . . , s(m) ∈ Rn×2m is given by:
φR+1,i,S(s, s
(1), . . . , s(m))
= min
{
softmaxS(si,S′ : S
′ ⊆M), softmaxS(s(1)i,S′ : S′ ⊆M), . . . , softmaxS(s(m)i,S′ : S′ ⊆M)
}
,
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where softmaxS(aS′ : S
′ ⊆M) = exp(aS)/
∑
S′⊆M exp(aS′).
We then have for any s, s(1), . . . , s(m), s′, s′(1), . . . , s′(m) ∈ Rn×2m ,
‖φR+1(s, s(1), . . . , s(m))− φR+1(s′, s′(1), . . . , s′(m))‖1
=
∑
i,S
∣∣∣min{softmaxS(si,S′ : S′ ⊆M), softmaxS(s(1)i,S′ : S′ ⊆M), . . . , softmaxS(s(m)i,S′ : S′ ⊆M)}
− min
{
softmaxS(s
′
i,S′ : S
′ ⊆M), softmaxS(s′(1)i,S′ : S′ ⊆M), . . . , softmaxS(s′(m)i,S′ : S′ ⊆M)
}∣∣∣
≤
∑
i,S
max
{∣∣softmaxS(si,S′ : S′ ⊆M) − softmaxS(s′i,S′ : S′ ⊆M)∣∣,∣∣softmaxS(s(1)i,S′ : S′ ⊆M) − softmaxS(s′(1)i,S′ : S′ ⊆M)∣∣, . . .∣∣softmaxS(s(m)i,S′ : S′ ⊆M) − softmaxS(s′(m)i,S′ : S′ ⊆M)∣∣}
≤
∑
i
∥∥softmax(si,S′ : S′ ⊆M) − softmax(s′i,S′ : S′ ⊆M)∥∥1
+
∑
i,j
∥∥softmax(s(j)i,S′ : S′ ⊆M) − softmax(s′(j)i,S′ : S′ ⊆M)∥∥1
≤
∑
i,S
|si,S − s′i,S | +
∑
i,j,S
|s(j)i,S − s′(j)i,S |,
where the last step can be derived in the same way as (25).
As with additive bidders, using additionally hidden layers ` = 1, . . . , R are standard feed-forward
layers with tanh activations, we have from Lemma 4 with Φ = 1, B = 1 and d = max{K,n · 2m}
N∞(G, ) ≤
⌈
max{K,n · 2m}2(2W )R+1

⌉da
where da is the number of parameters in allocation networks.
We now bound ∆L for the three architectures using the covering number bounds we derived
above. In particular, we upper bound the the ‘inf’ over  > 0 by substituting a specific value of :
(a) For additive bidders, choosing  = 1√
L
, we get
∆L ≤ O
(√
R(dp + da)
log(W max{K,mn}L)
L
)
(b) For unit-demand bidders, choosing  = 1√
L
, we get
∆L ≤ O
(√
R(dp + da)
log((W max{K,mn}L)
L
)
(c) For combinatorial bidders, choosing  = 1√
L
, we get
∆L ≤ O
(√
R(dp + da)
log(W max{K,n · 2m}L)
L
)
.
F.4 Proof of Theorem 7
We use the same notation as in Section F.2. In addition, we will use Ui to denote a uniform
distribution over Vi and U
Q
i to be the distribution of Q samples i.i.d generated from Ui. For ease
of exposition, we omit the subscript “w” on the utility function.
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Proof outline. For a fixed bidder, we show an uniform convergence result for a fixed bidder
valuation profile in Lemma 6. We extend this result to a sample S of L valuation profiles drawn
i.i.d. from distribution F in Lemma 7, where we bound the gap between the empirical regret where
the ‘max’ over misreports is computed exactly, and the approximate empirical regret. Combining
Lemma 7 and Theorem 1, followed by a union bound over all bidders completes the proof of
Theorem 7.
Lemma 6. For any fixed bidder i, assume for all v′i ∈ Vi, v′′i ∈ Vi, v ∈ V and ui ∈ Ui, |ui(vi, (v′i, v−i))−
ui(vi, (v
′′
i , v−i))| ≤ L‖v′i − v′′i ‖∞. Let Si be a sample of Q misreport generated uniformly over Vi.
Then for any fixed v ∈ V and any  > 0,
P
Si∼UQi
(
sup
ui∈Ui
∣∣max
v′i∈Si
ui(vi, (v
′
i, v−i))− max
v¯i∈Vi
ui(vi, (v¯i, v−i))
∣∣ ≥ )
≤ N∞
(
Ui, 
4
)
exp
(
−Q
( 
2L
)Di)
,
where Di = dim(Vi) (e.g. the number of items m for additive bidders).
Proof. By definition of covering number N∞(Ui, ), there exists Uˆi with at most |Uˆi| ≤ N∞(Ui, 4),
such that for any ui ∈ Ui, there exists a uˆi ∈ Uˆi with
sup
v,v′i
|uˆi(vi, (v′i, v−i))− ui(vi, (v′i, v−i))| ≤

4
Then for any ui ∈ Ui such that∣∣max
v′i∈Si
ui(vi, (v
′
i, v−i))− max
v¯i∈Vi
ui(vi, (v¯i, v−i))
∣∣ ≥  (26)
For any uˆi ∈ Uˆi, s.t. supv,v′i |uˆi(vi, (v′i, v−i))− ui(vi, (v′i, v−i))| ≤

4 , we have
 ≤ ∣∣max
v′i∈Si
ui(vi, (v
′
i, v−i))− max
v¯i∈Vi
ui(vi, (v¯i, v−i))
∣∣
≤ ∣∣max
v′i∈Si
uˆi(vi, (v
′
i, v−i))−max
v¯i∈V
uˆi(vi, (v¯i, v−i))
∣∣+ ∣∣max
v′i∈Si
ui(vi, (v
′
i, v−i))− max
v′i∈Si
uˆi(vi, (v
′
i, v−i))
∣∣
+
∣∣max
v¯i∈Vi
ui(vi, (v¯i, v−i))− max
v¯i∈Vi
uˆi(vi, (v¯i, v−i))
∣∣
≤ ∣∣max
v′i∈Si
uˆi(vi, (v
′
i, v−i))− max
v¯i∈Vi
uˆi(vi, (v¯i, v−i))
∣∣+ 
2
,
where the last step can be derived the same way as (21).
Thus we can claim for any ui ∈ Ui be such that 26 holds, there exists a uˆi ∈ Uˆi such that∣∣maxv′i∈Si uˆi(vi, (v′i, v−i))−maxv¯i∈Vi uˆi(vi, (v¯i, v−i))∣∣ ≥ 2 , then we have
P
Si∼UQi
(
sup
ui∈Ui
∣∣max
v′i∈Si
ui(vi, (v
′
i, v−i))− max
v¯i∈Vi
ui(vi, (v¯i, v−i))
∣∣ ≥ )
≤ P
Si∼UQi
(
max
uˆi∈Uˆi
∣∣max
v′i∈Si
uˆi(vi, (v
′
i, v−i))− max
v¯i∈Vi
uˆi(vi, (v¯i, v−i))
∣∣ ≥ 
2
)
≤
∑
uˆi∈Uˆi
P
Si∼UQi
(∣∣max
v′i∈Si
uˆi(vi, (v
′
i, v−i))− max
v¯i∈Vi
uˆi(vi, (v¯i, v−i))
∣∣ ≥ 
2
)
≤ N∞
(
Ui, 
4
)
max
uˆi∈Uˆi
P
Si∼UQi
(∣∣max
v′i∈Si
uˆi(vi, (v
′
i, v−i))− max
v¯i∈Vi
uˆi(vi, (v¯i, v−i))
∣∣ ≥ 
2
)
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For any uˆi ∈ Uˆi, let v¯∗i ∈ arg maxv′i∈Vi uˆi(vi, (v¯i, v−i)), we have
P
Si∼UQi
(∣∣max
v′i∈Si
uˆi(vi, (v
′
i, v−i))−max
v¯i∈Vi
uˆi(vi, (v¯i, v−i))
∣∣≥ 
2
)
≤ P
(
@v′i ∈ Si, s.t., ‖v′i − v¯∗i ‖∞ ≤

2L
)
=
∏
v′i∈Si
P
(
‖v′i − v¯∗i ‖∞ ≥

2L
)
≤
∏
v′i∈Si
(
1−Pv′ij
(
‖v′i − v¯∗i ‖∞ ≤

2L
))
≤
(
1−
( 
2L
)
Di
)Q≤exp(−Q( 
2L
)Di)
.
Thus we complete the proof.
We extend Lemma 6 to a sample of L valuation profiles drawn i.i.d. from F .
Lemma 7. For any fixed bidder i, assume for all v′i ∈ Vi, v′′i ∈ Vi, v ∈ V and ui ∈ Ui, |ui(vi, (v′i, v−i))−
ui(vi, (v
′′
i , v−i))| ≤ L‖v′i − v′′i ‖∞. Let S be a sample of L valuation profiles drawn i.i.d. from F and
S
(`)
i be a sample of Q misreport values drawn uniformly over Vi for each valuation profile v
(`). Then
for any  > 0,
P
(∣∣∣∣∣ 1L
L∑
`=1
max
v′i∈S(`)i
ui
(
v
(`)
i ,
(
v′i, v
(`)
−i
))
− 1
L
L∑
`=1
max
v¯i∈Vi
ui
(
v
(`)
i ,
(
v¯i, v
(`)
−i
))∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ 
)
≤ LN∞
(
Ui, 
4
)
exp
(
−Q
( 
2L
)D)
,
where the probability is over random draws of S ∼ FL and S(`)i ∼ UQi , and D = maxi∈N dim(Vi).
Proof.
P
S∼FL,S(`)i ∼UQi ,`=1,...,L
(
sup
ui∈Ui
∣∣∣∣∣ 1L
L∑
`=1
max
v′i∈S(`)i
ui
(
v
(`)
i ,
(
v′i, v
(`)
−i
))
− 1
L
L∑
`=1
max
v¯i∈Vi
ui
(
v
(`)
i ,
(
v¯i, v
(`)
−i
))∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ 
)
≤ P
S∼FL,S(`)i ∼UQi ,`=1,...,L
(
1
L
L∑
`=1
sup
ui∈Ui
∣∣∣∣∣ maxv′i∈S(`)i ui
(
v
(`)
i ,
(
v′i, v
(`)
−i
))
− max
v¯i∈Vi
ui
(
v
(`)
i ,
(
v¯i, v
(`)
−i
))∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ 
)
≤ P
S∼FL,S(`)i ∼UQi ,`=1,...,L
(
∃` s.t. sup
ui
∣∣∣∣∣ maxv′i∈S(`)i ui
(
v
(`)
i ,
(
v′i, v
(`)
−i
))
− max
v¯i∈Vi
ui
(
v
(`)
i ,
(
v¯i, v
(`)
−i
))∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ 
)
≤ LP
v∼F,Si∼UQi
(
sup
ui∈Ui
∣∣max
v′i∈Si
ui(vi, (v
′
i, v−i))− max
v¯i∈Vi
ui(vi, (v¯i, v−i))
∣∣ ≥ )
≤ L sup
v∈V
P
Si∼UQi
(
sup
ui
∣∣∣max
v′i∈Si
ui(vi, (v
′
i, v−i))− max
v¯i∈Vi
ui(vi, (v¯i, v−i))
∣∣ ≥ )
≤ LN∞
(
Ui, 
4
)
exp
(
−Q
( 
2L
)D)
,
where in the third inequality, we take a union bound over all profiles in S and the last inequality
follows from Lemma 6.
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Proof of Theorem 7. We start by noting that since each auction in (gw, pw) ∈ M has a allocation
and payment functions that satisfies a Lipschitz property, we have ∀ v′i, v′′i ∈ Vi, v ∈ V and ui ∈ Ui,
|ui(vi, (v′i, v−i))− ui(vi, (v′′i , v−i))| ≤
∣∣vi · (gwi (v′i, v−i)− gwi (v′′i , v−i))∣∣+ ∣∣pwi (v′i, v−i)− pwi (v′′i , v−i)∣∣
≤ ‖vi‖∞ · ‖gwi (v′i, v−i)− gwi (v′′i , v−i)‖1 +
∣∣pwi (v′i, v−i)− pwi (v′′i , v−i)∣∣
≤ 2L‖v′i − v′′i ‖∞.
We decompose the left-hand side of the desired bound. For any (gw, pw) ∈M
rgti(w)− r˜gti(w)
= Ev∼F
[
max
v¯i∈V
(ui(vi, (v¯i, v−i))− ui(vi, (vi, v−i)))
]
− 1
L
L∑
`=1
max
v′i∈S(`)i
ui
(
v
(`)
i ,
(
v′i, v
(`)
−i
))
− ui
(
v
(`)
i ,
(
v
(`)
i , v
(`)
−i
))
= Ev∼F
[
max
v¯i∈V
ui(vi, (v¯i, v−i))− ui(vi, (vi, v−i))
]
− 1
L
L∑
`=1
max
v¯i∈Vi
ui
(
v
(`)
i ,
(
v¯i, v
(`)
−i
))
− ui
(
v
(`)
i ,
(
v
(`)
i , v
(`)
−i
))
︸ ︷︷ ︸
term1
+
1
L
L∑
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Bounding term1 using techniques from Theorem 1 and term2 using Lemma 7, we have:
Ev
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,
From the proof of Theorem 1 (step 2), we know that N∞ (Ui, ) ≤ N∞ (U , ) ≤ N∞ (M, ).
This, along with a union bound over each bidder completes the proof of Theorem 7.
G Additional Discussion of LP Approach
Distretization Number of decision variables Number of constraints
5 bins/value 1.25× 105 3.91× 106
6 bins/value 3.73× 105 2.02× 107
7 bins/value 9.41× 105 8.07× 107
Table 8: Number of decision variables and constraints of LP with different discretizations for a 2 bidder, 3
items setting with uniform valuations.
In this appendix we discuss the number of decision variables and IC and IR constraints in
the LP -based approach [Conitzer and Sandholm, 2002]. We consider the setting with n additive
bidders and m items and the value is divided into D bins per item. There are Dmn valuation
profiles in total, each involving (n + nm) variables (n payments and nm allocation probabilities).
For the constraints, there are n IR constraints (for n bidders) and n · (Dm − 1) IC constraints (for
each bidder, there are
(
Dm − 1) constraints) for each valuation profile. In addition, there are n
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bidder-wise and m item-wise allocation constraints. In Table 8, we show the explosion of decision
variables and constraints with finer discretization of the valuations for 2 bidders, 3 items setting. As
we can see, the decision variables and constraints blow up extremely fast, even for a small setting
with a coarse discretization over value.
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